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    CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, I discuss the varying perspectives of stakeholders in the Syrian 
refugee crisis in Lebanon and the international significance of their current public 
discourse. In order to investigate this information, I travelled to Lebanon for 3 months, 
and I was able to visit a significant part of the Lebanese territories. My methodology for 
this research project included interviews, and an exhaustive process of observation. I 
chose a comprehensive diverse sample for my interviews that allowed me to triangulate 
the different perspectives found during the study. I decided to study the livelihoods of 
Syrian refugees and the role of stakeholders for my deep connection and interests in the 
Levant, and my interest to contribute to more dignified lives for disadvantaged 
communities. Growing up in Venezuela, a great receiver of migrants from the Middle 
East, helped me developed a connection resulting from relations with friends, family and 
neighbors of that origin, being the largest of Lebanese descent. An advantage of 
conducting fieldwork in Lebanon was that it was a very familiar country, where social 
dynamics, customs and lifestyles felt identical to those in Venezuela. In addition, for this 
project I also decided to take into consideration the role of Lebanese citizens, since they 
are part of the society currently hosting most Syrian refugees per capita, and it is 
important to acknowledge both groups in order to obtain a clear picture of the forces at 
work, by observing not only refugee camps, but Lebanese host communities as well. In 
addition, contributing to the refugees’ wellbeing in the country can be facilitated by 
knowing the perspectives among Lebanese, and this is the reason that their perception 
cannot be excluded. As well, I explore and analyze the varying perspectives of 
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stakeholders, INGOs, NGOs, and the government, in order to understand the implications 
behind the international significance of their public discourse. I chose to discuss this 
matter since the discordance among stakeholders has not been given enough attention in 
recent literature, and their varying perspectives are having a large impact on creating 
mistrust among international donors, consequently reducing the funding required to meet 
several capital objectives to address the challenges of the refugee crisis in Lebanon. This 
project is targeted at four main stakeholders; INGOs, NGOs, and the government, as well 
as the international community, which serves as the main funding source to address the 
crisis.  During the past 5 years, the massive influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon has 
increased dramatically. In February of 2016, Lebanon had 1,055,884 registered Syrian 
refugees (“UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response,” 2016), and in May of 2015 the 
Lebanese government ordered the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees) to stop the registration of new refugees (Handicap International, 2015).  The 
current refugee crisis in Europe has finally drawn the world’s attention to this pressing 
social catastrophe. The population in Lebanon is anticipated to surpass the 5.3 million 
mark in 2030 (DAR - IAURIF, 2005).  However, in light of the Syrian refugee crisis, the 
estimated number of people currently living in Lebanon is about 5.9 million, a rapid 
population increase 15 years ahead of the projected date (Government of Lebanon and 
the United Nations, 2015). This increase in the population places enormous pressure on 
Lebanon’s infrastructure, security concerns, and its ability to provide services, 
consequently increasing the tensions between Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees (UN 
HABITAT and AUB, 2015). Despite the growing tensions and aggressive rhetoric, 
solidarity between the two societies has been remarkable. Today, we find prolonged 
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challenges among Syrians and Lebanese (as a result of a protracted crisis that has 
displaced millions). A significant amount of challenges faced by refugees seem to point 
to the direction of a lack of leadership by government institutions,  and limited 
international aid to cover immediate and overwhelming needs among migrants and 
affected local communities. Unfortunately, contrasting statements among stakeholders 
seem to be the norm on the ground, creating confusion and mistrust among the 
international community. As a result, the most needed funding that Lebanon needs tends 
to be diverted to other countries with a clear policy and a structural administrative system 
that aid accountability, and the effective distribution of humanitarian assistance. In this 
project, I present the literature review relevant to the current crisis of refugees in 
Lebanon, and I introduce how the current public discourse of stakeholders in Lebanon is 
affecting the international response to the refugee crisis.  I also propose policy 
recommendations to the government, and general recommendations to INGOs and the 
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international community. However, I am aware that my recommendations might not be 
taken into consideration entirely, given Lebanon’s political situation and the complex 
relationship between stakeholders. Though, I emphasize the needs for a stronger coalition 
among stakeholders, with a more structured system with standard policies to address the 
current challenges of the refugee crisis, and I call for the international community to take 
bigger responsibility, not only by providing aid, but also by helping governmental 
institutions build capacity and promote enhanced governance. This in turn could benefit 
the refugees, and create a more capable Lebanese state with more sustainable and unified 
policies that could benefit the Lebanese people as well.  
Figure 1. Most Vulnerable Cadastrals, May Statistical Dashboard 2016, UNHCR. This 
figure show vulnerable locations that were visited during the interview process, such as Beirut, 
Akkar, and Bekaa.  
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CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL HISTORY: LEBANON 
Lebanon’s complex political history and present day developments pose several 
challenges to the Syrian refugees in Lebanon. In this chapter, I explore how the 
contextual complexity of the Lebanese state complicates the Syrian refugee dilemma, and 
I highlight the most important factors of the Lebanese political and social system that are 
having an impact on the Syrian refugee crisis in the country. Lebanon, a small country in 
the Middle East, has a population of about 4.5 million inhabitants, with approximately 2 
million refugees including Syrians and Palestinians. Lebanon’s capital is Beirut, and its 
official language is Arabic. It is considered a multiethnic society, mostly comprised by 
Christians, Sunni and Shia Muslims, and Druze. The Lebanese government is accordingly 
divided among sectarian lines. Lebanon is part of the fertile land of the Levant, and it has 
been part of numerous empires through history (including the Ottoman and Roman 
Empires). 
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Figure 2. Lebanese Map. A Lebanese political map to highlight its position and proximity to 
Syria. 
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Figure 3. Lebanese Map with Registered Syrian Refugees, September 2016, UNHCR. This 
map represents the locations with the largest concentration of registered refugees, and it includes 
some of the places mentioned in this project such as; Bekaa Valley, Tripoli, and Akkar.   
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Lebanese Confessional System  
It is key to explain briefly the confessional system and the Lebanese state, in 
order to understand the sectarianism and fear among some Lebanese against the majority 
of Syrian refugees, who tend to be members of Sunni Islam. The confessional system 
creates the grounds for sectarianism in Lebanon, which in the case of Syrian refugees are 
seen as threat that could affect the balance among religious groups. 
 The republic of Lebanon was established in 1943, after gaining its independence 
from France.1  The Lebanese system is considered a distinctive democracy in the Middle 
East, where various religious groups share authority. According to the original 
constitution, Muslims and Christians were originally represented in different spheres such 
as the Parliament, Council of Ministers, and all notable military and civilian positions. 
There is an estimated of 18 religious groups in Lebanon. The largest groups are the 
Muslims - Sunni, Shia, and Druze 2, and the Christians Maronites. A census has not been 
conducted since 1932, when Christians were the majority. There a many political 
motivations to avoid conducting another census, since it might upset the arrangements in 
the country, and upset some religious groups.3 The Christian Maronites hold the positions 
of the President, the Chief of the Army, and the Head of the Central Bank. The Sunni 
Muslims hold the position of Prime Minister, and Shia Muslims control the Head of the 
Parliament. This arrangement allows for the establishment of a system of checks and 
                                                            
1.  The constitution was implemented in May 1926, since then it has been amended to adjust to 
contemporary developments, and the changes were responsible for the birth of Lebanon’s second republic 
in 1989.  
2. Druze are considered Muslims. However, many do not believe this, while others believe this only 
as an act of self-preservation.   
3.  The Economist (2016). Current voter registration list published by the Ministry of Interior, and 
later removed, showed that Maronite Catholics, once the largest group, now make up only 21%. Shias, now 
lead with 29%, followed closely by the Sunnis, who make up 28%.  
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balances. An agreement between the different parties is required to implement any 
decision or decree.  
For several decades Lebanon has been a refuge for religious and ethnic minorities, 
but the exact share among the different groups in unknown (Crow, 1962, p.490). The 
sectarian organization in Lebanon is also present outside non-governmental spheres, such 
as educational and social organizations. These institutions reinforce the sectarian division 
through different languages of instruction, materials and religious teachings. 
The Ta’if agreement was put in place to end the shattering Lebanese Civil War 
1975-1990. The agreement focused on identity, sovereignty, and internal reforms. The 
Ta’if treaty was crucial in defining Lebanon’s Arab identity by yielding more power to 
Muslim Arabs (Knio, 2005, pp.227-228).4 Demands for reform of the sectarian system 
were met with the ruling elite’s campaign to reinforce their sectarian structure. The influx 
of Palestinian refugees during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict affected the already fragile 
sectarian balance and the crisis imploded into the Lebanese Civil War. The Ta’if accord 
was a Saudi-brokered deal that with the help of Syrian influence, put an end to the civil 
war.5 The accord was vital to end the civil war, but it failed in its goal of creating a stable 
second republic. The second republic was no more than a “sectarian, and therefore a 
discriminatory regime” (Ofeish, 1999, p.97). 
 
 
                                                            
4.  Most Lebanese accepted the agreement, however; most Christians considered the agreement as 
favorable to Syria’s influence in the balance of power, and for the continuation of Hezbollah’s operations in 
the country.  
5.  Three causes were included in the Ta’if accord as responsible of the Lebanese civil war, first the 
conflict of national identity, second the growing socioeconomic divide with unequal share of resources, and 
third the sectarian and discriminatory system. The Ta’if accord stated that the elimination of sectarianism 
was a national goal that must be attained through a specific plan.  
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Confessional System and the Cooperation between the Army and Hezbollah  
 It is important to understand the role of Hezbollah today, as well as in the past, 
and its relation with the Syrian refugee crisis. Hezbollah surged after Israel incursion into 
Lebanon, which came as a consequence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization using 
Lebanese territory to launch attacks against the Israeli state, creating widespread chaos 
and serving as a strong detonator for the Lebanese Civil War. Today, many fear that 
Syrian refugees could become a similar case to the Palestinians, creating social and 
political turmoil, and causing further hostility between Muslims and Christians. As well, 
Hezbollah, a Shia militia, is one of today’s main players in Lebanon and Syria, and the 
group tends to be afraid of the high number of Sunni Syrian refugees coming into 
Lebanon, given that some of them might target the armed group and the Shias, and 
further deteriorate the religious strife between Sunnis and Shias in the country. The 
confessional system is based on a sectarian system (al-nizam al-taiffya), which is 
considered by many politicians in Lebanon as the main factor responsible for the conflict 
before 1990. According to Ofeish (1999): 
Sectarianism is not necessarily synonymous with religiosity…One difference is 
that, while sectarianism may imply some intolerance of them (sectarian) ‘others’ 
and encourage feelings of competition with them, religiosity does not necessarily 
imply intolerance…religiosity may be personal, dormant, and passive … it is 
common to find people in Lebanon who have strong sectarian feelings and may 
exhibit sectarian behavior, but who are secular in terms of their daily conduct and 
general attitudes. (p.97)  
Ofeish (1999) claims that the elite in Lebanon sees sectarianism as a great tool to hold on 
to power. Therefore, the system is sponsored by elites in order to draw the lines of access 
to power and control over resources between the different associated participants of 
society (p.97).  
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 The confessional system originates from its Ottoman past. Later with the creation 
of a Lebanese Republic, confessionalism and regionalism were taken to a new level. 
Also, Crow (1962) argues that the negative aspects of the system are always emphasized, 
while ignoring the accomplishments it has achieved and the fact that, with the removal of 
the system, political problems would not disappear (p.499). In this regard, the Lebanese 
Army consists of the integration of all religious groups. Lebanese feel that the Army 
represents the whole idea behind Lebanon itself, one that symbolizes the country and 
represents the unity of the Lebanese nation.  
Hezbollah (Party of God) has overwhelming support among the Lebanese 
population – including the Christians – for ousting Israeli forces in May 2000. Gaub 
(2007) notes that it is claimed by many that Hezbollah is allowed to operate simply 
because the Lebanese Army is not strong enough to do its job). However, the 
overwhelming majority of Sunni Muslims in Lebanon rejects Hezbollah incursion into 
Lebanese politics and play as a member of the nation-state. Also, before Hezbollah 
surged, Lebanon was the official headquarters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), an armed player that used Lebanon as their base in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
In this sense, Israel incursion into Lebanon comes as a response to the conflict with the 
PLO. The PLO hosted itself in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, which are 
considered almost autonomous areas where the Lebanese government has little authority.  
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are victims of sectarian discrimination, based on the 
rationalization that integrating them into the Lebanese society would make them lose the 
right of return to a future Palestinian state. More likely, their inclusion might have upset 
even more the sectarian balance in the country (since most Palestinian refugees are Sunni 
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Muslims), and their presence has already caused political and social turmoil between 
Muslims and Christians. Palestinian refugees tend to be blamed for Lebanon’s Civil War, 
and they have been object of intolerance for the past 60 years. Today, the presence of 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon is seen by many as a crisis that has many similarities to the 
Palestinian refugee crisis, and many fear that the presence of Syrian refugees (majority 
who are Sunni Muslims) might upset again the sectarian balance, and bring about another 
civil war between all the different religious groups.  
Present-day Challenges of the Lebanese State: Weaknesses yet Strengths  
 A number of challenges that affect Lebanon today are similar to those that 
provoked the civil war of the 1975-1990. Socio-economic inequality is growing. The 
massive influx of Syrian refugees resembles the Palestinian refugee crisis, causing them 
to be discriminated against, and they are also seen as a threat to the sectarian balance in 
the Lebanese mosaic. Hezbollah has now increased its political participation, and widen 
sectarian tensions and its role as a resistance movement.  
 Politicians in Lebanon have long benefited from conflict and containing crisis 
after crisis by using these events as scapegoats to hold on to power. Today, it is just the 
turn of using Syrian refugees as scapegoats for the government’s (premeditated) inability 
to provide for its citizens. I mention ‘premeditated’ because the government might just be 
weak for its own citizens, but it remains strong and proactive about keeping in place the 
interests of the ruling elites together with the banking and real estate sector, and those 
who benefit from the particular weakness of the state apparatus. The government prefers 
to avoid rebellion by any means, rather than address and propose solutions to the root 
13 
 
causes of the problem. The administration remains hesitant to change the current status 
quo while the bases of the state keep deteriorating.6 Furthermore, the declining quality of 
public services in Lebanon is increasing.  Free enterprise and economic fulfillment are 
mostly available to the few and well-connected elite. The status quo remains deep-rooted, 
unchallenged, and unaccountable. The postponement of a rational solution will only 
result in a ‘the breaking-point, and radical change to become the only answer.’7 However, 
this stagnant political situation might play in favor of Lebanon in sight of today’s volatile 
political environment in the Middle East. Nowadays, Lebanon gives the impression that 
its political paralysis has been put aside, and the leaders are now taking back control of 
the government. The ‘political paralysis’ in Lebanon implies a lack of will from 
stakeholders to propose any comprehensive measure to address the Syrian refugee crisis, 
besides the current policies of containment. This paralysis poses and perpetuates the 
stagnant condition into which most refugees have fallen, creating a legal limbo and a lack 
of alternatives to find solutions to their crisis. In addition, the same paralysis affects the 
allocation of aid from International Organizations by indicating a lack of leadership, 
accountability and willingness among the ruling elites to make a way for solutions.   
Lebanon remains highly at risk to fall prey to the Syrian conflict, and politicians 
have used the conflict as a scapegoat to justify the problems at home, “Syrian refugees 
frequently take the blame for everything wrong within Lebanon, from economic hardship 
to failing basic services and growing insecurity - a trump card the political class plays at 
                                                            
6.  Regional turmoil has put Lebanon under enormous stress. Though it has become integral to 
Syria’s conflict and is bound to suffer from growing Sunni-Shia polarization, it has so far avoided a much-
predicted meltdown. 
7.  A shaky security framework, paralyzed political system, wobbly economy, crumbling 
infrastructure and the state’s waning ability to perform essential duties add explosive ingredients to an 
already unstable mix. 
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every opportunity instead of agreeing on a policy to address the challenge” (Intl Crisis 
Grp, 2015, p.10). 8  
  The complexities of interests from Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the clash between 
the Sunni and the Shia major powers about which direction should Lebanon go have long 
fueled the political paralysis, making it difficult for Lebanon to address several 
challenges, including the Syrian refugee crisis. On one side, the Saudi state together with 
Hariri, the banking sector, Qatar, Turkey and the anti-Syrian March 14th coalition, in 
opposition to the Iranian state together with Hezbollah and the March 8th coalition, rarely 
agree on a common ground and a way forward for Lebanon, which also has a large 
impact on proposing solutions to the refugee crisis.  
According to Maalouf (2015), considering the sectarian divisions among 
authorities, a viable solution would be for the Prime Minister to establish a crisis group 
that includes representatives of civil society organizations, political forces and other 
unbiased and active-experts. This option would allow for a rapid and effective action, 
allowing the (solution) participation and inclusion of more responsibly proactive parties 
(Al Monitor, 2015). This alternative could also be used to create a proactive working 
table of partnerships to address the refugee crisis.  
Lebanon’s political system is one of the main responsible for the stagnant 
situation where many refugees find themselves nowadays. Its inability to provide for its 
own citizens offers a clear picture of their lack of will to provide for others. The 
                                                            
8. Lebanon, today as in the past, is vulnerable to the regional tug of war. Rebel infiltration and an 
influx of refugees from Syria echo the pre-civil war context, when conflicting Lebanese stances toward 
Palestinian refugees and fighters paralyzed the political machinery and fueled grievances and polarization. 
Against this backdrop, it is unclear how and for how long the country can resist the stresses emanating from 
its neighbor’s conflict. 
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Lebanese state could simply not be interested in satisfying the needs of its citizens, but 
rather is interested in satisfying those of the ruling elite. The paralysis of the government 
obstructs prosperous social development, and the recent trash crisis in Lebanon is the 
latest addition to the list of political dysfunction that affects every aspect of Lebanese 
society. Lebanese have no other option but to joke about their government, considering it 
unable to do anything for them. Despite Lebanon being the envy of many countries in the 
region -substantial sources of water, natural beauty and free enterprise- the population 
has lowered its expectation from the government, while living with several struggles and 
challenges that are not being solved (NY Times). The long-standing crisis has put many 
Lebanese through tests, while strengthening their already outstanding pliability. 
Patronage, corruption, good contacts and personal networks have become the norm in the 
Lebanese society, where bribes flourish in this informal-type-of-government. Lebanese 
have become used to illegal practices, violence, and they have responded by working 
around complications that result from the current system (Intl Crisis Grp, 2015l, pp. 11-
12).9 It is important to highlight the protracted challenges being faced by the Lebanese 
people as a result of a lack of leadership from their own government, in order to obtain a 
clear understanding of the scope of the challenges being faced by many Syrian refugees 
in Lebanon, which are usually amplified. Lebanese people have it hard enough, for 
Syrian refugees, it has become a cycle of issues that are intensified by not having a clear 
legal status.  
                                                            
9.  Many Lebanese feel helpless and take part in – and become part of – this corrupt and ineffective 
system. “Where is the state?” they say. But its absence is also the result of our own actions. We have lost 
all sense of common good. Selfishness and petty interests shape our mentality. This goes from how we park 
our cars to how we “elect” the political class. 
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 There is a significant layer of issues in Lebanon, and all these circumstances 
would be critical enough in ordinary times. However, regional developments in Syria and 
the threat of ISIS have put Lebanon under significant pressure, and have placed the 
country at risk to become more destabilized. In addition, Lebanon faces the burden of 
millions of Syrian refugees, with an already burdened infrastructure and basic services 
for a country of roughly 5 million inhabitants, plus 1-2 million refugees (mainly Syrians 
and Palestinians). Indeed, the refugee problem takes precedence over the trash crisis; it 
involves experiences and difficulties from humans and sets the stage for the resurgence of 
an ethnic conflict among Lebanese and Syrians that could lead to an augmented and 
widespread Syrian-Lebanese civil confrontation. In the next sections, I will be exploring 
the dilemma of Syrian refugees, ethnic strife and the stakeholders’ implications within 
the Lebanese context of complex history and politics. As well, I will be exploring the 
international significance of these stakeholders’ public discourse, and how it affects the 
perception of the crisis, and the livelihoods of Syrian refugees and Lebanese 
communities.  
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CHAPTER III 
BACKGROUND  
In the following section, I will address the complexities behind Lebanon’s history 
and politics in regard to refugees and refugee camps. In addition, I will expand in my 
literature review the relationship between Education, the Lebanese Labor Market and 
Refugees’ Legal Status to highlight the domino effect that one of these could be having 
over the other. All these characteristics might be linked enough to create a chain reaction 
or accumulative effects over the livelihoods of Syrian refugees, and the housing and non-
encampment policy, which is entirely carved by all the factors in the literature review.  
The Syrian crisis has no precedent (with any other refugee crisis, and) with only the 
refugee crisis of World War II coming close. After Syria, the burden of the Syrian War 
has been the heaviest on Lebanon, a country with a crumbling governance system and 
now hosting the largest refugee population per capita in the world (UNHCR Syria 
Regional Refugee Response, 2016). The Lebanese government opened its borders to 
allow in refugees from Syria, who were at first welcomed by Lebanese nationals and 
asked nothing in return. As the crisis worsened, the high number of refugees became a 
massive burden on the Lebanese system, including security, shelter, education, 
economics, social, political, and others. The political resistance against refugee camps 
and solutions that look ‘permanent’ shake the influence and crisis response capacity of 
International Organizations and governmental institutions. This places Lebanon in a case 
of contextual complexity with multifaceted challenges that affect the development and 
adaptation of Syrian refugees in the country (UN HABITAT and AUB, 2015). 
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 Also, a number of factors that affect Lebanon today are similar to those that 
provoked the Lebanese Civil War of the 1975-1990, as previous refugee camps in 
Lebanon have had a disastrous and influential history on that war. The massive influx of 
Syrian refugees resembles the Palestinian refugees, who were blamed for Lebanon’s Civil 
War. Just as the Palestinians were considered upsetting to Lebanese political dynamics, 
Syrian refugees are also seen as a threat to the Lebanese state. Palestinian refugee camps 
today are perceived as an extra-territorial entity, where insecurity, radicalization and 
armed groups flourish. This experience heavily influences the Lebanese perspective on 
the Syrian refugee crisis (Dionigi, 2016, p. 22; Ibrahim, 2008, pp. 83-88).      
  These factors would be complicated enough in ordinary times; however, the 
conflict in Syria rendered this time a critical period for Lebanon, where the lack of 
political consensus has left the refugee crisis unmanaged for several months. Current 
policies on Syrian refugees are restrictive and the Lebanese perception of and response to 
refugees is a reflection of political and social tensions that have been exacerbated by the 
Syrian crisis (Dionigi, 2016, p. 22). According to International Crisis Group (2015): 
Lebanon, today as in the past, is vulnerable to the regional tug of war. Rebel 
infiltration and an influx of refugees from Syria echo the pre-civil war context, 
when conflicting Lebanese stances toward Palestinian refugees and fighters 
paralysed the political machinery and fuelled grievances and polarisation. Against 
this backdrop, it is unclear how and for how long the country can resist the 
stresses emanating from its neighbour’s conflict. (p.5)  
 
 
 The emergence of settlements all across Lebanon, and the inability of the 
international community to introduce effective rational solutions in Syria threaten to 
make this a protracted crisis that may remain in Lebanon for many years to come (UN 
HABITAT and AUB, 2015, pp.15-17).  
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 In addition, it is essential to understand the political economy of Lebanon and 
how it affects refugee’s policies and the country’s discourse in front of a large influx of 
low skilled migrants. As stated before, Lebanon’s government is on a weak position to 
deal with its own citizens, left alone the refugees. Known cases of corruption, kinship and 
nepotism among the political elite in Lebanon, fuel the already dysfunctional 
governmental structure. In consequence, the country is left with an endless political class 
that has little desire to propose any changes that would make life better for Lebanese, and 
propose proactive solutions for refugees, as long as they can remain in control of the 
political and economic machine. Yet, the influence of the political economy and the 
ruling elite take a very particular path when dealing with Syrian refugees. Issues of 
corruption, lack of good governance, lack of leadership, and weak institutions are widely 
known by the international community, which have a negative impact on the flow of 
foreign aid directed to the Syrian refugee crisis, making it very hard for local and 
international organizations to accomplish several fundraising goals. These challenges 
hinder many organizations from conducting their work, and fulfilling international aid 
projects, an issue in which I expand in my DISCUSSION chapter. Also, the political 
economy of Lebanon provides an explanation for the political class’ discourse in front of 
the refugee crisis. Briefly, Lebanon has always been dependent on a large low skilled 
labor class, and the current influx of refugee provides a further supply to this practice. 
Several refugees work illegally in the informal economy, which leads to exploitation, and 
low wages. As well, low wages only benefit the elite; therefore, there are very little 
incentives to propose policies that could improve the living conditions of refugees. This 
layer of challenges protract the crisis and the impediments of many refugees, which 
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might resonate with many of the Syrian refugees’ fear of becoming a similar case to the 
Palestinians, who’s challenges became a latent 50 year old catastrophe.  
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CHAPTER IV 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
When dealing with refugees, some countries decide to implement the necessary 
policies that adapt to their specific context, both political and socioeconomic. In addition, 
refugees might pose challenges of security, threats of terrorism, labor force surplus, 
integration disputes and unrest; however, these will depend on the particular location 
where they are being resettled or waiting to be resettled, as it is the case for many 
refugees in Lebanon. Certainly, refugee camps are repeatedly seen as incubators of social 
unrest, violence, and terrorism. It is argued that this is exacerbated by the bureaucracy of 
security controls, impeding the creation of social enterprise and dynamism. When 
numerous parties are involved in the management of a camp, tensions are expected to 
arise between relief agencies, the host government, and the refugees. It is important to 
point out that security should not be bestowed; rather, the engineering should focus on 
balancing security needs with those needs of the refugees, while protecting and 
preserving their customs (Beehner, 2015, pp. 157-XII). 
The challenges that Syrian refugees pose to Lebanon, and how they are being dealt 
with; have some similarities to other cases presented in this literature review. Many of the 
similarities include that Syrian refugees are seen a threat to the stability and security of 
Lebanon, given their possible connection with radical groups. Also, many Syrian 
refugees are considered as a threat to the social fabric of Lebanon, and as a potential risk 
of fueling another civil war in the country.  
Nowadays, the lack of domestic legislation that ensures the protection of refugees is 
the main concern. The debate between the Lebanese government and international 
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organizations on establishing refugee camps has been characterized by divisions and 
contrasting approaches (UN HABITAT and AUB, 2015, p.30). Lebanon, like many other 
Arab states, is not a signatory of the UNHCR 1951 Refugee Convention (Knudsen, 2009, 
p.54) therefore, refugees are subject to certain Lebanese jurisdictions. However, Lebanon 
has ratified many other treaties that outline a variety of rights including primary and 
secondary education, vocational training, discrimination on the basis of disability; 
gender, sex, religion, ethnicity, social origin, or other status is prohibited. This is 
significant because, even though Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention or its 1967 Protocol, the country “is still bound by customary international 
law on the treatment of refugees” that were previously mentioned (HRW, 2016, p.80).  
In the case of Lebanon, the UNHCR, in their report “Policy on Alternative to 
Camps,” emphasized integrating the refugees with the Lebanese community to guarantee 
their development, independence and normality (UNHCR, 2014, p.3). It is mentioned that 
refugee camps in Lebanon reduce refugees to a “welfare mentality,” affecting their sense 
of identity and security, and this dependency is a direct consequence of the paternalistic 
refugee-aid system (UN HABITAT and AUB, 2015, p.37). This reconfiguration by the 
UNHCR, in regard to the establishment of refugee camps for Syrian refugees, seems to 
be related to challenges faced in the contextual complexity of Lebanon that keeps defying 
the standards of international crisis response. 
Despite the limitations being faced by many disadvantaged Lebanese communities, 
especially in rural areas, their role is significant, and it took precedence as an alternative 
option for many, after the denial from the Lebanese government to set up official camps. 
Many Lebanese tend to host Syrian refugees directly in their homes (including strangers); 
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for example, they might offer a part of the house which is not being used to a refugee 
family, eliminating the cost of rent. Nevertheless, host communities are seen as 
vulnerable, and in need of assistance. Most of the help offered by the Lebanese is simply 
because of their humanitarian sympathy, rather than formal policy (Mackreath, 2014, pp. 
19-21). Mackreath (2014) reaffirms that, “the key question to emerge from the role of 
host communities in Lebanon, then, is whether the current combination of the local, 
national and international responses to the crisis will inspire long-term capacity building 
at the local level” (pp.19-21).  
Given these factors, I will be discussing specific themes in this literature review in 
order to highlight the main impediments that Syrian refugees are still facing after six 
years of fleeing the Syrian Civil War. Several issues are protracted, but in this literature 
review I decided to focus on the topics that are repeatedly mentioned in the interviews as 
the most relevant. The lack of solutions signal the overwhelming dimensions of the crisis 
for a country with limited resources, and the lack of good governance or preparedness 
that seems to be unable to cope with the rapid and large influx across its border with 
Syria. The importance and interrelation between the political background of Lebanon; 
historical experiences with previous refugees, and the constant challenges of refugees in 
different contexts, including the Lebanese, provide a clear structure and background for 
this project. All these ideas seem to tie together to explain a complex but also very 
particular discourse to deal with refugees, that is influenced heavily by its past; its present 
socioeconomic motivations, and future uncertainties of another civilian conflict.  
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Adaptation of Refugees into the Local Context 
There are broader historical factors that contribute to the mass movement of 
Syrian refugees to Lebanon, besides the intensity of the conflict. Lebanon and Syria have 
a historical association, which has resulted in the penetrable characteristics of the border 
between the two countries. To begin, Lebanon’s birth came as result of a partition from 
‘Greater Syria’. In addition, Syria has had a heavy influence on Lebanon, including a 
substantial military presence from 1976 to 2005, including the “Pax Syriana” phase that 
intended to secure influence in the country through diplomacy and military power. Over 
one million Syrians have had a heavy presence in the Lebanese labor market for decades. 
Similarities also include sharing the same language, religion, most cultural traditions, and 
social and family connections across the border. Before the conflict, Lebanon already had 
the largest number of Syrian immigrants (Dionigi, 2015, pp.30-32). All these factors 
should make the acclimatization of Syrian refugees into Lebanon easier. However, the 
historical association between the two countries could also be a double-edged sword. 
Ghanem (2014) found that as the political situation takes a complex character, hostility 
between the two communities is expected to rise, and suggests in relation to the Syrian 
crisis: 
The relationship between Syrians and Lebanese cannot simply be summed up by 
disagreements over jobs opportunities, rising rental prices, and shortages in 
housing. Historical animosity between both nationalities runs deep and spans 
decades, especially with regard to the previous Syrian military presence and its 
continuing political intervention in Lebanon’s affairs. The fact that Lebanese are 
fighting on opposite sides of the conflict in Syria also plays a key role in fueling 
tensions and triggering violence. (p.19) 
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Several challenges, including lack of education, problems with refugee camps for 
refugees and local communities, and the adaptation of refugees take a particular character 
when it comes to facilitating the access of refugees to the labor market. Several issues 
may make harder the access to a legal and skilled labor market; however, they seem to be 
promoting access to low-skilled labor, and adjusting to the labor demands of the host 
country. In order to understand the contextual complexities of Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon, I will examine refugee’s impediments in refugee camps and the failures of 
refugee camps to provide decent livelihoods. In following sections, I will explore Labor 
Force and the Refugees’ policies on place in Lebanon; Education; Impediments for Host 
Communities with Refugee Camps, and How Are Camps Perceived as a Source of Social 
Unrest.  
Impediments for Refugees with Refugee Camps: Failures of Refugee Camps to 
Provide Decent Livelihoods 
Impediments for refugees in refugee camps do not only arise in Lebanon, but it is 
a tendency that happens repeatedly. Perhaps, it could be argued that these impediments 
come as a result that refugee camps are sometimes used past that temporal stage for 
which they were initially created.  Loveless (2013) states: “There are very few 
opportunities for employment, so many refugees resort to desperate measures to cover 
their costs. These include prostitution, early marriage, begging and working for 
exploitative wage” (pp.66-68).10 Settlements’ services are not any better than outside 
conditions in providing for the refugees, and many refugees are forced to move to urban 
                                                            
10.  In addition, a lot of refugees are forced into black market activities such as selling their organs for 
monetary compensation.  
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settings to seek better opportunities (UN HABITAT and AUB, 2015, pp.42-44). 
However, legal status and basic rights are essential when refugees move outside to 
provide for themselves and their families. The level of abilities offered in camps does not 
seem to be helping the refugees develop freely outside them. After six years of conflict, 
we come across a massive wave of refugees from rural and urban origins mainly flowing 
to the informal labor market, because it is the one with fewer restrictions on employment. 
Regardless of several academics arguing that refugees could be used as a positive 
element on the Lebanese economy, adding more vigor and effort to create more jobs, the 
Lebanese government is not benefiting from the refugee skillsets due to the restrictions 
on employment against them (UN HABITAT and AUB, 2015, p. 64). Syrian refugees 
perceive employment in the urban setting as a way to enhance their adaptation to the city 
and secure decent livelihoods. In addition, their study found that most Syrian refugees 
reject the idea of being housed in camps (UN HABITAT and AUB, 2015, p.65). In these 
cases, limited skills provided inside settlements along with the restrictions on 
employment might represent a challenge to securing good employment in the preferred 
urban setting. The exploitation of refugees and the appearance of illegal jobs is common 
(Baghdadi and Banat, 2014, p.105). According to Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2016) 
“refugees are coping by reducing expenditures on food, borrowing money, withdrawing 
children from school, and relying on their children to earn income for basic need” (p. 21).  
 Several refugees find themselves trapped in this long list of challenges, and 
camps are usually not the place to promote social mobility. Refugees are not given 
enough flexibility in camps; although their self-will to improve should be embraced, it is 
instead strictly regulated. Beehner (2015) suggests that the social engineering aspects of 
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future refugee camps should be improved like the Za’atari camp in Jordan - where 
stakeholders saw the importance of flexibility and adaptability (pp. 157-XII). In addition, 
the lack of quality education is a major factor that affects the ability of camps to promote 
socioeconomic flexibility for refugees, on which I would be expanding briefly in the 
following section.  
Labor Force and Refugees’ Policies   
I present a comparison of the policies of Lebanon and Jordan in order to 
understand the arguments behind the motivations by these two countries to apply policies 
on refugees. In the particular case of Lebanon, the policy of non-encampment followed 
by the Lebanese government has certain ‘out of sight purposes’. The non-encampment 
serves the Lebanese’s labor market goals, since the Lebanese economy requires a large 
number of low-wage Syrian workers. There are historical experiences, security and 
budgetary motivations for Lebanese policies on refugees. Jordan has used encampment to 
raise the profile of Syrian refugee camps, and increase the funds it receives (Turner, 
2015, p.387). On the other hand, Lebanon’s approach is in favor of the interests of the 
economic elite, while in Jordan it serves the regime’s rural supporters that struggle to 
cope with the influx of Syrian refugees due to higher unemployment levels. 
The encampment of refugees in Jordan is also beneficial to the humanitarian 
organizations running refugee camps, since it improves administrative efficiency, and by 
having refugees perceptible and contained, it aids to attract donations and funds (Turner, 
2015, p. 388). In addition, according to Turner (2015), “Syrians in Lebanon, regardless of 
when they entered the country, could now simultaneously be thought of as refugees and 
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members of the informal labor force” (p. 398). The policies of non-encampment is a 
method through which the state creates the required scenario for the exploitation of the 
labor force. At the end, the state obtains an increased labor supply, low wages, and a 
foreign labor force which is used to drop the quality of economic conditions for non-
nationals and nationals alike (p. 399). 
Certainly, the use of refugees by state actors such as Jordan and Lebanon differ 
significantly from each other; however, these two have in common that providing quality 
education and social flexibility is not a priority, rather it is considered a luxury by many 
refugees. In this sense, I elaborate on the challenges of education among refugees in the 
following section. 
Education  
It might seem obvious that without education, refugees might lose the chance to 
acquire their full potential as citizens and other benefits such as productive employment 
(Charles and Denman, 2013, pp. 96-111). However, education is not embraced in 
unofficial settlements, although it is something that could help normalize the life of 
children who have been victims of countless traumas. Children need to recover the sense 
of stability, security and normality, and a higher emphasis on education would allow 
them to begin the healing process. The younger generations are the ones who are going to 
be responsible for rebuilding their lives and their country; therefore, their emotional and 
physical preparation is highly important (Charles and Denman, 2013, pp. 96-111). On 
this sense, the Lebanese government has been taking measures in order to enroll Syrians 
in formal education, and they publicly recognize that all children should have the right to 
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an education (p.23). 11,12 For example, in Turkey, Syrian teachers have been allowed to 
work as public school teachers in order to reach more students; however, Lebanon does 
not consider this a possible solution to their overwhelmed public education system (p.57).   
Impediments of a lack of quality education for refugees are substantial, as 
education is one element that could help refugees adapt better to the local context by 
promoting social mobility and an enhanced engagement with their surroundings. In 
addition, education could provide a way to acclimatize better and become part of the 
socioeconomic dynamics of the host country in a legal way; however, it appears that the 
story has taken a different path for many. 
Impediments for Host Communities with Refugee Camps 
Several host communities face impediments as consequence of incoming 
refugees. For example, the extended presence of Colombian refugees in Venezuela was 
always considered a security threat by many locals in light of the connections that these 
refugees could have had with radical groups and drug trafficking schemes. In a similar 
case, mistrust of local Venezuelans against recent Cuban refugees increased dramatically 
in past years as Cuba’s proxy war in the country reached palpable levels. Several times, 
those concerns are entirely valid and connected with the reality, but is not always the 
case.  In Lebanon, despite the initial warm welcome by host families to Syrian refugees, 
after four years into the conflict, most Lebanese worry about the security threat from 
refugees, and usually this concern takes precedence over the initial humanitarian nature 
                                                            
11.  The Education system in Lebanon has struggled to keep pace with the growing number of Syrian 
refugees in the country.  
12.  By the beginning of the 2015-2016 school year, there were 495,910 registered Syrians aged 3-18, 
far more than the 294,494 Lebanese children enrolled in public schools that year.  
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of the response (UN HABITAT and AUB, 2015, p.59).  In addition, the creation of 
parallel systems of education, financial assistance, healthcare, and other basic needs by 
international agencies creates resentment among the poor local population toward both 
the refugees and the international aid system. In Lebanon, this mistrust of refugees by the 
local population has led the government to practice exclusionary policies (UN HABITAT 
and AUB, 2015, p.39). According to Turner (2015), “Inter-communal tensions have been 
fueled by rising prices, the increasingly sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict, sectarian 
clashes within Lebanon, the aid distribution to Syrians in close proximity to poverty-
stricken Lebanese communities, and competition for jobs and falling wage rates (ILO, 
2014a; International Crisis Group (ICG), 2013; Naufal, 2012; WB, 2013)” (p.390). 
Lebanese and Syrians agree that tensions are rising between the two communities, which 
creates violence and friction in some areas. In Naba’a, a suburb mostly comprised of Shia 
Muslim and Christian Armenians, but also including other faiths, Lebanese fear for their 
safety and the safety of their families, which in consequence reduces empathy for the 
Syrian presence. Discontent is growing between the populations, and Syrians are 
becoming more fearful of further coercive measures (UN HABITAT and AUB, 2015, 
pp.60-61) 
Impediments of refugee camps for the local population result in the aggravation of 
challenges by the already disadvantaged communities of refugees, since the host 
communities’ impediments and burdens tend to take precedence over the dire critical and 
humanitarian needs of refugees. As a result, the discontent among locals against refugees 
is just another factor that adds up to the long list of challenges faced by war refugees. In 
the following section, I present how camps are perceived as a source of social unrest.  
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How Are Camps Perceived as a Source of Social Unrest?  
Certainly, refugee camps are repeatedly seen as incubators of social unrest, 
violence, and terrorism. It is suggested that this is exacerbated by the bureaucracy of 
security controls, impeding the creation of social enterprise and dynamism. In a particular 
case, the fear behind establishing camps and the main reason for the reluctance of the 
Lebanese government to create these settlements is their experience with Palestinian 
refugee camps. The Lebanese government is afraid the camps will become similar centers 
of “radicalization and militarization” (UN HABITAT and AUB, 2015, p.46). The 
contextual complexity of refugee camps in Lebanon stems from their traumatic 
experience, which is reflected in their responses to this crisis. The Palestinian experience 
has become the “scarecrow” behind the complexity of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
(UN HABITAT and AUB, 2015, p. 46).  The Lebanese government’s refusal to the 
encampment of Syrian refugees relates to the permanence of Palestinian refugee camps. 
Turner (2015) notes that Hanafi and Long (2010) stated, “ The 1969 Cairo Accord 
granted Palestinian camps administrative autonomy and permitted Palestinian factions to 
launch attacks on Israel from Lebanon” (p.390). In addition, as Turner (2015) notes, 
Hanafi and Long (2010) stated, “The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was able 
to build many independent institution within Lebanon, and refugee camps, controlled and 
governed by armed factions, were at the heart of Palestinians’ projects of nation-building 
and armed struggle” (p.390). Also, Turner (2015) notes that Knudsen (2009) adds that 
despite that the Lebanese government repealed the Cairo Accord in 1987, these camps 
remain an autonomous political center of Palestinian factions and armed groups (p.390). 
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The conception of considering refugee camps as centers of social unrest is a trend 
that does not only happen in Lebanon, as it is the case of refugee camps in East Africa, 
considered centers of terrorism and radicalization for militant groups. In addition, recent 
unrest among Ivorian refugees on a refugee camp in Italy have proved that these centers 
have been able to maintain its bad reputation.  As well, refugee camps are not only seen 
as incubators of social unrest and radicalization, but also, they could pose several 
challenges to host communities that could increase tensions between the refugees and the 
local population. In this matter, I briefly explain how the creation of parallel systems for 
camps creates resentment among the local population by overlooking their own 
impediments, intensified by an unexpected influx of refugees that apply pressure on 
already weak infrastructure and the socioeconomic apparatus. 
Further, I will be exploring some of these issues as they relate specifically to 
Lebanon and the dilemma of Syrian refugees. It was essential to present how the factors 
mentioned above serve as a solid base to understand the issues and arguments raised in 
the presentation and analysis of my data. All these themes presented are issues that seem 
to be persistent in most refugee camps and local communities around the world; however, 
these issues take a particular character in Lebanon. Its historical experiences with 
refugees and contextual sociopolitical forces at work transform the panorama and present 
many trials that defy qualified approaches by stakeholders in refugee’s crisis. In my 
methodology chapter, I present the empirical methods of data collection that were 
necessary to capture several of the varying perspectives in a complex topic of increasing 
international significance.  
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                                                CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGY  
Field research for this thesis project was conducted from June to September of 
2016. I conducted interviews with refugees and their families, and obtained information 
on their most common impediments, including other information they thought was 
relevant for my project. I also conducted interviews with engaged Lebanese citizens, and 
some members of the Lebanese-Venezuelan community in Lebanon. Some of the 
interviewees from the group ‘refugees’ were contacted through personal networking, and 
some others were identified through local NGOs. All the interviewees from the groups 
“Lebanese citizens” and “Lebanese-Venezuelans” were identified through my own 
personal network of acquaintances and through connections with members of the 
committee of this thesis project. As well, I conducted interviews with local and 
international humanitarian organizations, and government advisers for parliamentary 
development. Also, I engaged in an exhaustive process of observation of the livelihoods 
of Syrian refugees, INGOs and NGOs engagement in the crisis, sectarian tensions, 
opportunities of access to stakeholders, censorship and self-censorship, political rhetoric, 
and the perception of the crisis among the population.  
The interviews were semi-structured, and I strived to maintain diversity – gender, 
ethnicity, and background- in the sample. I was able to engage with my subjects in 
English and also in Arabic, in light of my previous training in Urban Arabic at the Saifi 
Institute for Arabic Language. The only exception were Lebanese-Venezuelans, whom I 
engaged with in Spanish. The interviews maintained the same structure with enough 
similarity to allow me to triangulate the samples’ responses later, and be able to observe 
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the qualitative consistency. To guarantee the confidentiality and privacy of my subjects, I 
provided anonymity during the analysis and synthesis of data. I used pseudonyms or 
members of a group (refugees, Lebanese citizens, Lebanese-Venezuelans, NGOs and 
INGOs) for publication and presentations.  
Table 1. General composition of my interviewees.  
Purposive sampling had the most relevance in the selection of my sample, 
specifically heterogeneous sampling; this method allowed me to use my knowledge to 
select subjects. The heterogeneous technique allowed me to capture a comprehensive 
perspective of the issue, and have a variety of perspectives. In addition, it provided me 
Interviewees Class Gender Age 
Group interview in 
the settlement of 
Tamnine el Fawka 
Low 
high levels of 
poverty  
Mixed Varied. 
Mostly mid-age 28-35 
years old. 
NGO and INGO 
representatives 
Middle to Upper 
Middle Class 
Mixed Mostly mid-age 28-35 
years old but also 40-45 
years old. 
Refugees outside 
settlements 
Low  Male only Young age from 20 to 
28 years old.  
Lebanese 
Interviewees 
Low, Upper Middle 
Class to High 
Mixed Varied 
Lebanese-
Venezuelans 
Upper Middle Class 
to High 
Mixed Young age from 21-24 
years old 
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with better insights into the crisis by looking at it from different angles (Berg, 2007, pp. 
44-45). I used snowball sampling to locate subjects through my acquaintances in 
Lebanon of Lebanese-Venezuelan background, through connections of members of this 
thesis committee, and through personal networking in my Arabic language training. Lee 
(1993) suggests that snowball sampling is good for researchers interested in studying 
sensitive topics, or difficult to reach populations (quoted from Berg, 2007, p.44).  
According to the International Labour Organization, the maximum variation 
sample, also called a maximum diversity sample or heterogeneous sample, aims to select 
a sample that is more representative than a random sample. This technique does not focus 
on selecting samples randomly; instead, it focuses on choosing a diverse sample. The 
main purpose of this technique is to be comprehensive, and triangulate the different 
perspectives found during the study (Elder, 2009, p. 7).  
Interviews took place in Beirut, Tripoli, Bekaa Valley and Mount Lebanon. I 
spent multiple days travelling to these locations, and I decided to focus on two isolated 
settlements in the Beqaa Valley that did not seem to receive much public attention. My 
other interviews were among refugees who lived outside settlements, in rural and urban 
areas. My interviewees originated mainly from Aleppo, Raqqa, Homs, and Damascus.  
I informed all the interviewees of the purpose of this research, and of my 
intentions of publishing it in articles, thesis report and presentations through the Public 
Impact Fellowship by the University of Oregon. Also, I informed all the interviewees that 
they were not obligated to participate in this research, it was completely voluntary and 
they had the right to withdraw at any time without any consequence. I explained I did not 
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provide humanitarian services or I was not connected to any NGO, INGO, government 
entity and political party. However, I explained that bringing some issues and concerns to 
light might facilitate the work that stakeholders are carrying on the field, and it might 
collaborate with the discourse of stabilizing the crisis in Lebanon. I conducted an oral 
consent for each interview. Participants did not receive any material compensation for 
speaking with me.  
I did not conduct any other kind of investigation of quantitative characteristics, 
however; my findings and conclusions are based on extensive interviews of a minimum 
duration of 45:00 minutes supplemented by my comprehensive observation and analysis 
of the situation. I met with representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Nabad for Development, Human Rights Watch, Search for Common Ground, 
Parliamentary Advisors of Development, and other representatives of Foreign Diplomatic 
Missions located in Beirut that were engaged with the refugee crisis. I have withheld to 
identify other organizations in order to avoid putting at risk current projects of 
humanitarian operations. Also, I have withheld identification of other parties that 
requested anonymity.  
In this research, the word “refugee” refers to anybody over the age of 18, of 
Syrian origin currently residing in Lebanon who identifies as a refugee. In addition, the 
word “Lebanese citizen” refers to anybody holding Lebanese citizenship and who is a 
current resident of Lebanon at the time of this research. The word “Lebanese-
Venezuelan” refers to anybody that is a member of the Lebanese diaspora in Venezuela 
or a mix between Venezuelan-Lebanese origins who hold Venezuelan citizenship and 
Lebanese citizenship/residence permit, that due to the current situation in the Latin 
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American country have decided to find new horizons in Lebanon. I strived to use the 
word “informal settlements” during my research to clarify that these are not a 
governmental plan, or in any way an official response to the crisis.  
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CHAPTER VI 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA  
Syrian Refugees: Education, Legal Status, and Labor Force 
 In this section, I prioritize the issues that were emphasized by my interviewees as 
the most important. At first sight, when entering the field, it is possible to see a scarce but 
not absent presence of refugees begging in front of traffic lights and around areas such as 
Hamra, Achrafieh and Saifi. This includes small children approximately 5-8 years old 
selling gum, flowers, or water bottles. I was constantly advised by locals to not contribute 
anything to the “beggars” (as they mentioned) since they were probably victims of 
exploitation by a local mafia. When I arrived on June 21, 2016 a curfew was put in place 
recently that prohibited Syrians to be out after 8 P.M. for alleged security reasons. In 
addition, I encountered a lot of self-censorship and fear among Syrians (mostly those who 
were in a clandestine situation) to give interviews, as they were afraid that their private 
information would be published. In other cases, I encountered that some refugees were 
surprised that I wanted to interview them, while stating, “Why me, my life is shit, all I 
have done all my life is work and work.” The mistrust from the refugees was completely 
normal and expected, and in light of rising tensions, several Lebanese were also scared to 
conduct interviews. Thankfully, having and establishing contacts on the ground were the 
best ways to obtain interviews, and use a snowball sampling. The country itself seemed to 
run relatively okay without a president, and I was told by a friend that they do not need 
one, and it is even in the constitution, “That the country should keep running, even with 
the absence of a president.”  
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  On the other hand, in many of the Christian areas of Beirut, such as Gemmayze, 
the heavy rhetoric and xenophobia against Syrian refugees is a rising concern. I witnessed 
racist and bigoted comments, and in the worst cases, some of the residents of these areas 
engaged in verbal aggression against Syrian refugees, telling them to go back and how 
they would never feel pity for them. It is important to point out that Gemmayze is a 
predominantly Christian area of Beirut, where French and Phoenician identities are 
emphasized heavily over the Arab identity. I would sometimes find myself in awkward 
situations while looking for traditional Arabic dishes, to only be told that they only had 
French patisserie. I found sectarianism very present in many areas of Beirut, for example, 
in Gemmayze many residents love to emphasize their religious inclination with an 
immense gold cross on their chest.  
During my interviews in Achrafieh, I was amazed by the aggressive rhetoric of a 
resident that I happened to come across, she was completely angry and one of the things 
she stated during the interview was: “ I like that Syrians work, but they work in the 
trash.” I kept listening to her, and she started calling refugees thugs, big thieves that steal 
everything. According to her, refugees were getting paid less and consuming more, and 
they were also affecting the economy in Lebanon and damaging public services such as 
electricity and water. The lady never elaborated on her argument and neither did she 
provide evidence, just a heavy discriminatory rhetoric. After her statement and desire to 
“kill them all since they stole all Lebanon,” I decided to thank her for her time and 
disposition, and proceeded to leave.  
 The situation on the ground was not the safest; however, the heavy military 
presence of the Lebanese army gave the impression of safety, and that they were doing 
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their best. During my first week of fieldwork, some of my recently-met colleagues from 
other universities doing similar research received a notification from their schools to 
return and abandon the field in light of the increasing and known threat by Daesh to 
engage in attacks where foreigners tended to commute (Gemmayze, Mar Makheil, 
others).  
 During my time in the field, Daesh carried out an attack against the Christian 
village of AlQaa, in the Beqaa Valley which is the eastern province of Lebanon that 
borders with Syria. After these attacks, security and checkpoints were tightened around 
the country, and the overwhelming risk of a bigger scale attack was always haunting. I 
conducted most of my research in the Beqaa Valley, with the help of a local NGO. The 
majority of the people in the area were extremely helpful, and willing to stop their 
activities to assist one.  
 Most of my interviewees were from the settlements around the Beqaa Valley in 
the eastern border with Syria; Mount Lebanon; the city of Beirut; Akkar and Tripoli in 
Northern Lebanon; and Tyre (Sour) on Southern Lebanon.  Perhaps the city where I felt 
more tension was Tripoli, and the one with less tension seemed to be Tyre (Sour) in 
Southern Lebanon. I found access to all these places to be relatively easy. However, I was 
impressed by the stigma placed on Southern Lebanon by many Beirutis, who perhaps 
have only been there once or twice. Southern Lebanon, an area mainly controlled by 
Hezbollah, was very well maintained (at least at first sight), peaceful and with people 
enjoying their meals in restaurants, souks, or relaxing at the beach. It was also highly 
secured; therefore, the general feeling of safety in Southern Lebanon was palpable, in 
contrast with Tripoli.  
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 In the unofficial settlements that I visited, in the area of Tamnine el Fawka, I was 
surprised by the welcoming of the people, despite not having much, they go out of their 
way to make you feel greeted and welcomed. Even when I was on-route to the Beqaa, 
everybody was willing to help and provide me with assistance to get to my destination. I 
was always asked for my nationality, after them noticing my accent in my broken Arabic; 
however, my nationality was perhaps one of my best tools while trying to make 
connections, since it was something that was always received with a smile and a sense of 
kindness by Syrian refugees and Lebanese. I believe the historical ties, friendship and the 
reciprocal movement of people between these lands and Venezuela was the biggest factor 
that allowed me to make meaningful connections. In addition, I blended pretty well, 
which was great at the time of travelling two or three hours from Beirut using public 
transportation to my destinations. Indeed, I take pride on finding my way around every 
time with broken Arabic and Google Maps.  
 I constantly made trips to the area of Tamnine El Fawka, since I established a 
good relationship with one of the Syrians that was living in that settlement. He welcomed 
me to his house, and introduced me to his whole family. I was told to be the first 
foreigner to visit and wonder about them and the settlement, a statement that surprised 
me. I was told that, since it was a Sunni camp in a Shia area under Hezbollah control, that 
they were not receiving much attention from the International Community, especially in 
contrast with areas such as Arsal in Northern Lebanon. During my trips to this settlement, 
I received a massive amount of help from the local NGOs. In this settlement, I was told 
several times that the biggest impediment was to find clean water, in addition to the 
recent curfew that deterred most of the inhabitants of the settlement to move freely. Also, 
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UNHCR apparently does provide help with the materials for the tents; however, the 
residents do not receive any type of allowance or monetary help from the organization. 
The material and conditions of the tents were dreadful, and indeed not conditioned for the 
hot summers or chilly winters of Lebanon. I was told by many residents of this settlement 
that most people and staff from UNHCR that deals with this specific camp are somehow 
disconnected from the local population, and that the mistreatment to the vulnerable 
refugees is denigrating. Many refugees mentioned how they see a relationship of colonial 
style, since several staff members from the UNHCR working with this camp come from a 
French background. Many of them were accused of acting arrogantly, and as extremely 
paternalistic against the refugees of this settlement.    
The challenges faced by many Syrian refugees in Lebanon are indeed protracted 
impediments that deter this group of displaced persons from having a more dignified 
livelihood. In addition, a weak nation-state framework prevents the creation of any 
significant policy that could improve the current status of Syrian refugees. The current 
discourse of official governmental actors seems stagnated, and a lack of leadership and 
planning on this issue might be the reasoning for this procrastination. However, it is 
important to mention that Lebanon’s resources and infrastructure were already going over 
capacity before Syrians refugees came, which exacerbated most of the already existing 
problems.  
 Some of the most common impediments mentioned by refugees included: 
working permits and legal status, immediate needs (water and food), access to basic 
services (potable water, transportation, etc), forced marriage, education, discrimination 
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and adaptation, hospitality, their current economic challenges, and a decreasing freedom 
of movement.  
 In the interviews conducted, the need for major aid was mentioned (water and 
food), and how this makes the work of the international community a bit harder, since 
they are currently focusing more on development, rather than humanitarian aid. The 
difficult conditions, requirements and limitations to obtain work and temporary residency 
permits were impediments emphasized by all interviewees. First, to obtain a temporary 
residency card is extremely tough, and for those that obtain it, the renewal process is 
incredibly difficult. To obtain a temporary residency permit, each individual needs a 
Lebanese sponsor, which costs around 300$. Therefore, imagine a family of 5 members 
trying to obtain sponsorship, when refugees make at the most $500 per month. In 
addition, some Lebanese have decided to ask for more money, to benefit out of the 
suffering and desperation of many refugees. In most cases, my interviewees compared 
this system of ‘sponsorship’ to the Kafala sponsorship program system in the Gulf States, 
which creates an underground business for people to engage in exploitation of refugees.  
Without a residency permit, refugees might be detained at official army checkpoints. In 
addition, nowadays, basically nobody obtains a work permit, most foreigners and 
development practitioners of European background come to Lebanon and work illegally 
for 3 months, leave and come back, and this becomes a cycle. Most foreigners use 
‘learning Arabic’ as an excuse to get through immigration.  Recently, several 
organizations have decided to get rid of foreign workers in light of less funding coming 
from aid.  
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Before my field research took place, and during the trip, I made several assumptions 
of the topic. While I was working on my proposal, I assumed that social cohesion 
between Lebanese and Syrian was easier than what it actually looks and feels like in the 
field.  The reality is that, this concept of social cohesion between these two groups is very 
challenging, in particular with older generations. However, according to my field 
research indicated, it is sustainable and possible with younger generations, as they tend to 
see each other with better eyes. In addition, I made the assumption of Daesh (formerly 
ISIS) having a bigger role and posing a bigger and constant threat to the country as the 
media tends to show; however, their presence and actual menace has been reduced 
considerably that nobody seems to be worried much about them. I also had the 
assumption of Hezbollah as being a party of mercenaries; however, on the field it was 
more than an armed group. After encountering them and being in their territory, I came 
out with the view that they were actually more a political/militant group/party that 
provided several social services to numerous Lebanese, and the neighborhoods and areas 
under their control were most of the time well taken care of. In addition, I learned their 
fighting focuses more on an existential battle for the Shias, for the Lebanese state, and for 
them both as a political party and as a religious group in Lebanon.   
Several refugees mentioned the negative attitude adopted by staff members of 
international organizations. This issue was not found in my literature review; however, I 
did not find it surprising, since most INGOs in Lebanon (were) mostly comprised of 
foreigners with little understanding of the population at risk. However, recent changes in 
the Lebanese policies now require these organizations to hire a least an 80% Lebanese 
staff. However, one my interviewees from Tamnine el Fawka mentioned that staff from 
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INGOs, making particular reference to UNHCR, do not seem to be connected enough 
with Syrians, and the services they provided are of low quality. The interviewee mentions 
that the previous French colonial rule, and the fact that several staff members of this 
INGO are French, who behave as being ‘superior’ than the refugees, proves that many 
might still see Lebanese and Syrians as their subordinates. As a result, refugees complain 
and do notice how these past and current power-roles might play on the ground.  
It is possible that many refugees perceive this issue with a notion of post-
colonialism/neo-colonialism, with several paternalistic and bad treatment characteristics 
of INGO’s staff towards refugees. Truly, this suggestion goes against their public 
discourse and how it does play into our perception of their role in the crisis.  In addition, 
there are varying perspectives among stakeholders, with different public discourses, 
which in turn shapes the international perception of their actions on the ground. I 
elaborate more on this idea at the end of this analysis.  
 Some of the most common impediments I found are consistent with the 
impediments presented in my literature review, from uncovered basic needs, difficulty 
obtaining work and residency permits, discrimination and harassment, lack of freedom of 
movement, to access to an education with no real value in the job market. Other 
challenges that I found in the field were a result of recent measures implemented by 
Lebanese authorities, such as the curfew. “Refugees are often victims of detention, 
repatriation and restrictions on their freedom of movement” (UN HABITAT and AUB, 
2015, p.39), which agrees with my findings on recent curfews and policies that limit the 
refugees’ freedom of movement.  Surely, several policies of the Lebanese authorities 
aggravate the impediments that many low skilled Syrians might face in Lebanon, and the 
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current state of deadlock on the Syrian refugees’ legal status makes the crisis 
unsustainable.  It seems that the government is pursuing this policy of deadlock to 
motivate refugees to find risky ways to relocate to another country, or promote their 
return to Syria; their undocumented status does not allow them to have access to legal 
ways of relocation. This also is consistent with the arguments presented in by UN 
HABITAT and AUB (2015), that coercive methods are used to hinder social integration 
and encourage the return of these refugees to Syria (p.39).  In addition, in agreement with 
Human Rights Watch (2016), “it is a cycle of impediments, and the majority of them are 
the direct consequence of the inability to obtain these permits” (p.42), I believe every 
challenge has its roots on the inability of refugees to normalize their legal status.  
Education  
 My interviewees spend most of our interview time discussing their impediments 
to access education, and its future implications, not only for Syria, but for Lebanon as 
well. A Syrian refugee, stated that surely education is good, but the problem is about 
what people ‘could do’ with that education. People are not given certificates for the 
education being provided in settlements, and, therefore, it has no value in the real world. 
The Lebanese government does not provide a certificate even if the refugees have access 
to public schools. The same interviewee mentioned that these educational programs were 
being carried out just because it was good for the displaced population to keep their 
minds running. However, this education cannot be taken anywhere, refugees cannot 
become hired; therefore there is no real benefit. I found that refugees do have access to 
public schools, but they cannot come in the morning since Lebanese students are there, 
resulting in the creation of a second shift for Syrian students. Syrian students come and 
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leave at night, creating problems with transportation and freedom of movement 
(especially after the imposed curfews). In addition, it was mentioned that the Lebanese 
curriculum presents a considerable challenge for many refugees, since it is taught in 
French and English, in contrast to the Syrian curriculum which is only in Arabic. 
Therefore, if an individual is a Syrian student, and he/she has been taught in Syria for 3-4 
years and then suddenly they are forced to leave, and start learning something in a 
language they are not fully familiar with, then that creates major problems. Certainly, 
Syrians have access to public schools, but now the following question would be, what 
kind of access? They might have access, but that access is useless if Syrians cannot 
understand what they are being taught. Additionally, teachers are not being paid enough, 
and this becomes a cycle of never-ending problems.  
Another Syrian refugee mentioned that education was very important. The first 
three years, his children registered in Lebanese private schools for 2-3 years, but at the 
end, they discovered that they would not obtain a certificate, “so it was a big shock for 
them.” The interviewee believes that “a certificate will help refugees settle better, and at 
the end it will be beneficial for Lebanese society.” In addition, for him, “Syrians are 
good, the society is a good society. I know a lot of people have misconceptions, but for 
me the most important thing is the education for children. Because if the children do not 
have education, what will they do in the future?”  
 Several of my interviewees were highly educated individuals, some studying 
engineering or pharmacology back in Syria. In Lebanon, they have no other option than 
to work for low skilled jobs and settle for hard labor. In these cases, they might work 
from 9:00am to 12:00am and make only $500 a month. $500 in Lebanon could be 
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washed away easily just by paying a monthly rent in an overpriced and undersupplied 
apartment in Hamra or Achrafieh.  However, a lot of Syrian refugees have decided to 
take action and help their fellow citizens, and serve as volunteers in NGOs to help and 
contribute to the cause.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Twelve interviewees agreed that education was probably good, but access to it was 
limited and without no real value. Three interviewees said the quality of education is terrible. 
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Figure 5.  Among twelve interviews, the most prevalent issues were Language of Instruction, 
Transportation and Curfews, in addition to Safety Concerns and No Certificate. 
 
 There is a variety of obstacles that limit the type of access that refugees have to 
education in Lebanon. From the language of instruction, lack of quality education, the 
cost of transportation, the safety of children returning from schools after dark, to lack of 
support for refugee children (Human Rights Watch, 2016, p.29).  
  I believe education is extremely important so that new generations of Syrian 
children are not left behind and do not become a lost generation, and have the opportunity 
to rebuild their country in the future. Also, I believe insufficient international aid by 
international organizations to help Lebanon cope with the new necessities affects the type 
of access that Syrian refugees have to education. In addition, the lack of compliance by 
Lebanese schools, and the lack of leadership by Lebanese authorities to enforce their 
current policies on education leaves many refugees without the opportunity to obtain 
BIGGEST IMPEDIMENTS FOR 
EDUCATION
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access to more dignified lives. Perhaps, the creation of a vocational certificate program 
such as carpentry, plumber, electricity and other hard-skills could help refugees find more 
accessible work post-study. According to one of the interviewees “The quality of 
education is terrible, and paying for transportation is a struggle.” Some mentioned that 
for them there is no way to cope with all these challenges, just prayer.  
Legal Status 
 One of my interviewees mentioned that child marriage has become the norm 
among poor families of incoming Syrian refugees, who decide to marry their daughters to 
Lebanese men in order to help the family and normalize their legal status. Normally the 
girls are as young as 13 or 14. In addition, discrimination and tensions between Syrians 
and Lebanese are rising. Currently, recent curfews after 8pm forbids Syrians’ freedom of 
movement.  One of my interviewees of Syrian and Armenian background stated “If they 
(Syrians) are walking on the street, they might get beaten up, humiliated, and IF you have 
documentation (legal status), you will only get beaten. If you do not, you will get beaten 
and taken to jail.” If refugees are registered with the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, the Lebanese state has no right to deport them; but if they are not 
registered, then refugees would normally get deported and sent back to the war. It was 
mentioned by the same interviewee, that after the Daesh attack on the AlQaa village, it 
was automatically blamed on Syrians, and “they (Lebanese) always blame the weaker 
link.” In addition, he mentioned that a lot of issues now in Lebanon are being blamed on 
Syrians, even issues that existed before (labor, deteriorating basic services). According to 
him, for refugees there is not a specific way of coping with this crisis; they only pray that 
they will never get stopped at a checkpoint.  
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The Syrian refugees’ unclear status as migrants makes it very difficult for 
anybody to help and provide assistance. One of my Syrian interviewees, stated “The 
problem is that, if they are given status as refugees then there would be obligations from 
part of the Lebanese government, and that government is not even able to provide for its 
own citizens.” For organizations to be able to help a migrant fully, my interviewee 
mentioned that they need to be given some type of status. But, he believes that it will 
never happen in Lebanon, since they do not want the same that happened with the 
Palestinians in the past. According to the same interviewee: 
No way, the history has a huge role on the perception and response. This is why 
when you mention integration there is fear, and when you mention settlements, 
there is fear. Also, the presence of Syrians in Lebanon, the way Syrians treated 
Lebanese, the way Syrians were imposing certain things in Lebanon, there are a 
lot of bloody memories from that. 
 
 According to the same interviewee, the result today is a bitter position from the 
Lebanese towards Syrian refugees. A lot of Lebanese are actually happy about the Syrian 
war, and many believe that Syrians deserve it. It is harsh, but it is the memories and the 
history of Syria’s previous intervention in Lebanon. 
Also, in the next interview with a refugee from Tripoli, in Northern Lebanon, 
believes that discrimination is heavy, but he mentioned: 
People as refugee, they have to show a good image about themselves in this new 
society. When you do that, you can adapt to the new conditions. But at first, 
initially, you will suffer from discrimination. You have to be smart enough to deal 
with this problem, to find solutions, to find a job and acclimatize to this new 
society. You have to have determination, it is very important.  
 
Another interviewee in Northern Lebanon, a refugee from Akkar, mentioned how 
he had applied for resettlement in a different country two times with the UNHCR, but it 
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has not worked out for him. This type of story was challenging to hear, as I was unable to 
help in significant way. I was asked many times for help to leave Lebanon, and get to 
Canada or the US legally. Sometimes, I would do my best to provide some assistance and 
guidance, but more realistically, could only provide empathy.  
Initially, most refugees thought that the crisis would only be for a short period of 
time. That perception among refugees of the crisis has been changed over the past six 
years. A refugee mentioned how he wanted the crisis to be done, but this will not happen 
fast and that, especially now, a lot of people started living in different places. He stated 
that in Lebanon, many people want to go back because nobody feels comfortable there, 
most of them do not have any papers and they are not welcomed. In other countries such 
as Turkey, people are good over there, everything is provided for them, and it is easier for 
refugees to obtain legal documentation; therefore, they feel better. In Jordan as well, 
Syrians are more comfortable than in Lebanon.  My interviewee, a refugee stated “ I want 
the war to stop, for people to start thinking and planning about going back, and the 
rebuilding process, which might take 10-15 years for things to start rolling. It is hard to 
predict how long it is going to be.” The social infrastructure and the economy are 
damaged, on top of the trauma that needs to be addressed. In another interview, a refugee 
in the Beqaa Valley described his perception as “nothing is clear, destruction, darkness.”  
During another interview, I was told this crisis will take a long time to resolve. In 
addition, according to this interviewee, “Syrians must accept the variety in their society 
and live with each other, and come together to finish the crisis. Otherwise, everything 
will keep escalating and it will never end. I hope other countries can help Syrians solve 
this crisis, in any way.” 
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Lastly, in another interview in the Beqaa Valley, a refugee mentioned that the 
treatment of some Lebanese against them is bad, and discrimination is rising. In addition, 
job opportunities are precarious, especially for Syrians with university degrees. The 
quality of education is terrible, and paying for transportation is a struggle. My 
interviewee states, “Without education you get criminals, terrorist. Syrians cannot do 
anything, we are powerless. ” The interviewee was afraid their situation could become 
the same as the Palestinians. As well, he was afraid that if he returns to Syria, he will not 
be able to work. Finally, my interviewee emphasized that most international NGOs were 
not connected enough with Syrian refugees. He stressed the fact that the treatment and 
services they received from these INGOs were bad.  
 
 
Figure 6. For eleven interviewees the main concern is their legal status, such as work permits and 
residence permits.  Only two responded ‘less concerned’. The inability of most refugees to solve 
their legal status hampers them from registering in schools, attaining legal employment, freedom 
of movement, and securing decent livelihoods. 
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Figure 7. Implications of a legal limbo for Refugees 
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 I have briefly discussed how the presence of refugees in Lebanon might lead to some 
dividends and benefit the economy and society of Lebanon. 
  Several Syrian refugees mentioned how the refugees in general are very beneficial to 
the Lebanese economy, since a lot of Syrians came to Lebanon with capital to spend. 
They rented houses, and invested in the Lebanese economy. The NGOs or INGOs pay for 
supplies to Lebanese contractors and companies. These organizations rent buildings, cars, 
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refugees with a “blue card,” some type of allowance, which contains money to buy food 
from Lebanese suppliers and farmers. Most of the refugee interviewees agreed that the 
Syrian presence in Lebanon definitively leads to some dividends for the country.  One 
stated: 
It definitely will and it has, and that is something not many people like to 
acknowledge. When talking about the different components of the Syrian society, 
many of them came to Lebanon with a lot of money, other Syrians payed a huge 
amount of money as rent and hotel reservation. They are absolutely contributing 
to the economy, ESPECIALLY with the millions of dollars of aid coming into 
this country, millions of dollars which are being paid to Lebanese in salaries 
working for all these NGOs and INGOs, and particularly now that these 
organizations have to have at least 80% of Lebanese employees and only 20% 
foreigners. Millions of dollars go to basic suppliers that provide for these 
organizations. I do not understand why people keep complaining, it is a small 
country with limited resources indeed, and it is difficult for a country of 4 million 
to host almost 2 million refugees, but there have been several benefits for 
Lebanon, and there have been many problems as well.  
 
In addition, the same interviewee tackled the issue of government leadership, since 
many Lebanese complain about Syrians taking their jobs. However, according to him, if 
the state really desired Lebanese to obtain jobs and get paid, then the state should enforce 
their law accordingly on Lebanese employers who are hiring Syrians for lower wages. He 
believes this issue needs to be regulated, and Syrians should be able to work as 
foreigners, with legal documentation. But considering the inaptitude from the current 
administration, organizations and local NGOs have had to take the lead, since every 
problem seems to go back to the government. Whenever organizations have to fill the gap 
of the Lebanese government, then that is worrisome. According to the same interviewee 
“in the government there is no vision, no leadership, and politicians always divert to 
refugees. Of course there are damages to the services and infrastructure for the amount of 
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people coming in, but at the same time there is a lot of money coming in to maintain all 
these services.”  
  During my interviews, when addressing the question on the capacity of Lebanon 
to absorb and provide employment to new incoming migrants, most of my interviewees 
were not entirely sure. However, one my interviewees believes that there is a lot of 
entrepreneurial work happening, which is good for everyone. Not only construction, but 
other helpful initiatives such as communal kitchens and other projects. On the other hand, 
one of my interviewees from Tripoli believes that the Lebanese labor market is not able 
to do this, and he recommended that Lebanon needs help from the international 
community in accomplishing this task. “There is 2 million refugees, so almost half of the 
Lebanese people. They have to be smart to deal with it. Lebanon might need foreign aid 
to deal with this problem.”  
  According to the majority of my interviews, Syrians are surely beneficial to the 
Lebanese economy since they came with capital, they rent houses, and keep investing in 
the Lebanese economy. There is also a massive amount of aid coming into the country to 
respond to the crisis, and most international organizations use Lebanese contractors and 
supplies for their projects. As well, most international organizations also invest in 
Lebanese infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals, which, in the end, benefits both 
refugees and Lebanese. Interviewees suggest that the presence of Syrian refugees could 
lead to some dividends and benefit the Lebanese economy and society, and Lebanon is 
counting on the development industry to achieve this. My findings have several parallels 
with those of  UN HABITAT and AUB (2015), that notes that the influx of Syrian labor 
force could benefit the country’s productive power that would further economic 
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development, and it would improve social cohesion between host communities and 
refugees. Also, the same study suggests that Syrians prefer to be part of urban settings, 
and they believe that their beneficial economical input should be acknowledged since 
they are contributing to the development of the country (pp.64-65).  
  The presence of refugees has certainly provided Lebanon with great amounts of 
international aid and assistance, and it has given a bit of a boost to its economy. A 2.4% 
GPD increase in Lebanon, where 1.6% comes from humanitarian aid (International 
Monetary Fund, 2015, P.6 and UNDP-UNHRC, 2015). 13 There are several development 
and entrepreneurial projects being developed because of the refugee crisis, and most of 
these projects are benefiting Lebanese people as well. Many Lebanese tend to blame 
Syrians and use them as scapegoats; however, I believe the government has fallen short 
in taking a greater position of leadership in dealing with the crisis, and certain 
organizations have to fill the gap. Many of the inactions resulting from the lack of 
leadership by the government result in many challenges and issues being officially 
unattended, resulting in a protracted long list of matters that all seem to go back to the 
state. The majority of the economic elite capitalizes on low-wage Syrian labor, and the 
policies of the state have been planned accordingly. However, these measures have taken 
a toll on the less privileged nationals and Syrian refugees. As mentioned previously by 
Turner (2015), “Syrians in Lebanon, regardless of when they entered the country, could 
now simultaneously be thought of as refugees and members of the informal labor force” 
                                                            
13.   As for the broader macroeconomic impact of the crisis, a recent UNDP study estimated the 
multiplier associated with humanitarian aid at around 1.6. Thus, while the (net) impact of the crisis has 
clearly been negative, aid inflows in 2014 added 1.3 percent to overall GDP growth. 
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(p. 398). In addition, the policies of non-encampment is a method through which the state 
creates the required scenario for the exploitation of the labor force (p.399).  
  One of the interviewees states, “In the government there is no vision, no 
leadership, and politicians always divert to refugees. Of course there are damages to the 
services and infrastructure for the amount of people coming in, but at the same time there 
is a lot of money coming in to maintain all these services.” If the Lebanese government 
directed its efforts to work with organizations in addressing many of the issues of the 
crisis, and decided to take a bigger role, then the possibilities of social and economic 
development for Lebanese and refugees could be substantial. I believe if the new 
Lebanese leadership of Michel Aoun decides to take a new approach on this issue, then 
the prospects of sustainable development for Lebanon would look brighter. As long as 
there is aid coming in, the government could find a way to allocate this aid accordingly 
and offer the Lebanese people a way to build capacity while helping refugees.  
 
Figure 8. For eleven Syrian refugees, they all agreed that the temporal presence has and will lead 
to some dividends and benefits to the economy and society of Lebanon. One answered ‘don’t 
know’.  
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Lebanese Citizens Perception Overview 
During the second phase of my interviewing process, I interviewed Lebanese 
citizens, including Lebanese-Venezuelans. Many Lebanese had similar perspectives on 
the crisis. One of my interviewees, a student at the American University of Beirut of 
Lebanese-Venezuelan ancestry, believed that everybody was being affected by the 
refugee crisis, no matter their nationality. However, for my interviewee, being part of the 
elite group at AUB; the crisis affected him less.  My interviewee emphasized that people 
from small towns are the most affected, increasing rent prices and inflation are major 
concerns due to higher levels of consumerism and demand. The competition for jobs has 
increased, except in medicine and academia, which are jobs that refugees have no access 
to.  
 My interviewee stated (translated from Spanish), “In such a small country like 
Lebanon, and with so many issues, the best is to avoid racism and discrimination. Zero 
discrimination against Syrians, and whenever it is possible to help, do help. Personally, 
my interests are centered in Venezuela and not in Lebanon, but as a resident of Lebanon I 
see myself obliged to do something.” My interviewee suggested how because of this 
crisis, the Lebanese are becoming more and more divided, since the demographics are 
changing significantly. “You have the Catholics and Shia who are against having so 
many Sunnis in Lebanon for example. Second, the radical change in demographics 
creates more tension and discrimination because of the considerable number of refugees 
that Lebanon is currently hosting.” My interviewee also mentioned how in the Issam 
Fares Institute of the American University of Beirut several investigations are being 
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carried out, and it has been found that in the poorest areas of Lebanon, resentment against 
Syrians is higher. This resentment is the consequence of Syrians receiving monetary aid, 
in contrast to poor Lebanese who do not receive any type of assistance.  Several Lebanese 
have even tried to make others believe they are Syrians, in order to escape to Europe and 
obtain some kind of benefit out of the situation.  
My interviewee reminded me how, in 1948, there was the Palestinian refugee 
crisis, and how it was a very similar situation, and how the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-
1990 is actually attributed to the presence of Palestinians refugees by many Lebanese. He 
said, there are armed conflicts in Arsal and Akkar, in Northern Lebanon, precisely due to 
the high number of refugees in these areas. Indeed, the presence of Syrian refugees can 
bring dividends to Lebanon, but only if the government works toward that goal. 
However, today, according to my interviewee, many Lebanese people wonder, “if 
Lebanon would not have done it, then who else? (The act of receiving refugees freely 
without almost any kind of control), because Jordan closed its borders, Turkey closed its 
borders, and Lebanon is the only one that still accepts refugees despite being such a small 
country. If the government sets up a specific strategy in order for the refugee crisis to 
produce some dividends for Lebanon, then of course it is possible for Lebanon to receive 
some type of benefits. There are many ways to generate profits, such as the 2.4% GPD 
increase in Lebanon, where 1.6% comes from humanitarian aid (International Monetary 
Fund, 2015, P.6 and UNDP-UNHRC, 2015). My interviewee gave Jordan as an example, 
a country with a clear strategy in front of the crisis, where the state is generating about 
600$ per refugee; however, their system of encampment is completely different from that 
of “free” movement in Lebanon. According to my interviewee, recent studies have found 
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that even Syria is generating profits out of all the humanitarian aid and all the resources 
that come from INGOs, and other organizations that have to deal with the Syrian 
government.  
But despite the fact that it is possible to generate profits, my interviewee 
mentioned that the Lebanese labor market is in no way able to absorb incoming migrants. 
He mentioned how many of his friends graduate and decide to leave for the Gulf 
Countries, because there are not enough opportunities in Lebanon. Indeed salaries are too 
low compared to the monthly average expenses in Lebanon. The minimum monthly 
salary is $500, and a room in Hamra (west Beirut) can cost up to $800 a month. The 
Lebanese economy does not have the capacity to provide jobs for its own citizens, 
leaving zero chances for refugees. The economy is damaged, but if the current 
administration decides to direct all the profit to create more jobs and opportunities, then 
the economy could have a slight chance of improving. My interviewee stressed the lack 
of leadership as one the biggest issues in Lebanon, and how it fails to deal with every 
societal or economic issue.  
In addition, my interviewee believes that the Lebanese context is very complex if 
you compare it with other countries. He believes that every government and nation-state 
must protect itself in order to find balance and protect its fellow citizens. He believes that 
the Lebanese government has been proactive in prioritizing its citizens, including AUB, 
where the number of Syrians who can receive employment is limited, in light of 
government regulations. Indeed, the Lebanese context makes everything harder for 
refugees, and the same happened to the Palestinians without legal documentation or the 
right to own property. But that is the Lebanese system, and it is a system with little hopes 
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of changing significantly. Another interviewee was a Lebanese NGO worker, from 
Mount Lebanon, who works with the Lebanese Red Cross and Search for Common 
Ground. In this case, my interviewee mentioned that the crisis does not really affect him, 
though, he is trying his best to improve the refugees’ livelihoods and help them generally. 
He believes that after five years, the Lebanese government needs to come with a solid 
and clear solution to avoid the Syrian refugees’ dilemma becoming more like the 
Palestinian crisis. However, unlike Palestinians, Syrians still have hope to return home 
According to my interviewee, the administration in Lebanon is just postponing any 
reform on refugees as far possible until the situation improves in Syria, so the refugees 
can just go back. 
My interviewee from AUB considers that the education provided in settlements is 
negative in a certain way since they do not receive any certificate that provides affidavit 
of that education that could improve their social mobility. However, my interviewee 
mentioned how vocational education (carpentry, mechanics, builder, plumber, etc.) is 
positive even though it does not provide a certificate, because people are being taught 
real-life skills that are useful in the labor market.  
My interviewee also mentioned how the education provided in settlements is 
definitely not enough for children. He believes that Syrian children should have more 
opportunities in this matter, and they should be able to obtain certificates just as the 
Lebanese do.  
There are broader historical factors that contribute to the mass movement of 
Syrian refugees to Lebanon, in addition to the intensity of the conflict. Lebanon and Syria 
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have a historical association, which has resulted in the penetrable characteristics of the 
border between the two countries (Dionigi, 2016, pp.30-32). Indeed, the connection 
between the two countries goes beyond that of the current conflict. It was not very 
difficult to find the same argument on the ground, Mr. Jean Nicolas Bauze from UNCHR 
agrees:  
When it comes to civilians, there has always been a lot of interaction between 
both Lebanese and Syrians. They were the same country, and there has always 
been a lot of contact of nomadic people moving back and forth, including 
intermarriages between Syrians and Lebanese. The border between the two 
countries is not as strict, when the crisis started in March 2011, several Lebanese 
people really welcomed Syrian refugees. During the 2006 war, a number of 
Lebanese took refuge in Syria, and it has been a tradition of people taking refuge 
in one side or the other. When the crisis started, the Lebanese knew who was 
coming, so they accepted them like family and accepted them at home. When the 
crisis started and unfold in Syria and more refugees started coming, the hosting 
capacity of the Lebanese population started to diminish. Still, it is easy to find a 
lot of generosity today from the Lebanese people. Lebanese are totally aware that 
people are fleeing a conflict, they have no choice, they are here because it is the 
only way of being safe, and Lebanese are aware of this. But it is also a part of 
being welcoming.  
 
I believe that this might be one of the reasons why many Syrian refugees choose 
Lebanon, instead of any other neighboring countries such as Jordan or Turkey, or simply 
because it is easier to get into Lebanon. The current perception among Lebanese varies 
depending on their religious group and other affiliations. Heavy rhetoric against refugees 
is very common in Christian areas. The story changes as you move to Muslim areas. 
During my interviews, I found that because of this crisis, the Lebanese are becoming 
more and more divided, since the demographics are changing significantly. According to 
Mr. Bauze, for the most part, most Lebanese are aware of the severity of the conflict, and 
despite the heavy rhetoric some tend to use, some are still willing to help and provide 
assistance. However, tensions and sectarianism are at very-high levels, which could be 
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dangerous for the future of Lebanon. The role that the Lebanese community is playing is 
significant, but now certainly the concerns of terrorism and Daesh are taking precedence 
over the humanitarian character of the crisis. The political stalemate had many on edge, 
wondering ‘what was going to happen next;’ however, the majority of the people I met 
were unpreoccupied and often wondering “The government, who needs them? We are so 
used to doing everything by ourselves.” This is one of the coping and resilient strategies 
that many Lebanese have applied.  
The perception among Lebanese changes depending on the area. In Shia areas, 
people are mostly against and terrified of refugees, in Christian areas, they are a bit 
afraid; but in Sunni areas, they are not so afraid. This comes due to the fact that the 
majority of the refugees are members of the Sunni community, changing the 
demographics rapidly and making other communities feel threatened. Many see this 
influx as a wave against the sectarian balance among religious communities that exists in 
the country.  
Relationship between Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Citizens  
Syrian Refugees 
 Despite several organizations working on social cohesion, the reality on the 
ground remains severe. I believe the most common response I was receiving when I 
asked refugees and Lebanese for the possibility of bringing both of them together for 
cohesive initiatives, was that neither of them were at the same level to make this work. 
One of my interviewees, a refugee from Raqqa, Syria, who resided in one the unofficial 
settlements I visited, stated, “It is not a suitable time to ask such questions. You have to 
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give dignity to Syrians first. It is necessary to put Lebanese and Syrians at the same level 
before talking about social cohesion.” In his case, as many other Syrians, they did not 
choose to go to Lebanon, but he mentioned that if he was given the choice to either go to 
Jordan or Turkey, he would not do it, since he feels more comfortable in Lebanon.   
Another interviewee from Akkar, living in Northern Lebanon, looked at me with 
astonishment when I asked the question about Syrians and Lebanese coming together, 
and he laughed when I mentioned social cohesion. He believed it is a dream, but he 
thinks that the most important thing that can create social cohesion between Syrians and 
Lebanese is education and the option to have them both together in schools.  He said, 
“When you put them together from an early age, they will build friendships and leave 
prejudices behind. Also, it is important to create projects that bring Lebanese and Syrians 
together.” He explained to me that this will allow Lebanese children to start building 
friendships with Syrian children, and they will begin to visit each other, not only the 
children, but also the parents. When I questioned my interviewee as to why he chose 
Lebanon, he answered that it was because he has relatives in Akkar. In addition, he 
mentioned that, “in each society you find good people and bad people, at first, when the 
number of refugees was low, it was a very good hospitality, but later when very large 
numbers came, it caused so many problems for them (the Lebanese). Nevertheless, they 
have also benefitted from this influx, without a doubt, so it is bad and good at the same 
time. ” 
Another interviewee, an INGO worker from Beirut who left Syria in 2012, 
believes that the most important thing now should be about deescalating the situation, and 
a lot of the time the approach is basically finding a common interest between both parties 
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(Syrians and Lebanese). He provides a good example, “In the trash crisis, which affected 
everyone, many Lebanese and Syrians worked together to recycle and clean the streets. 
This issue was not about ‘You are Lebanese, and I am Syrian’, but it was about ‘We both 
live in this neighborhood’ and they all wanted their place clean. Therefore, he suggests 
that finding the common interest is very important. In addition, he mentioned that is it 
easier to work with youth, since they have not seen or experienced the Civil War or what 
Syrians did in Lebanon. For him, it is crucial to change attitudes before changing the way 
people think. He states: 
The attitude here is them (Syrians and Lebanese) not coming together, them not 
meeting. So, if you ( the INGO/NGO), change that attitude by bringing them 
together, by finding a common interest, where they cannot think about those 
prejudgments and stereotypes, and just be there and play football together. The 
main idea is changing attitudes, and then changing behavior and this will later 
change their mindset.  
 
 
His story was a bit different than most of my interviewees. He had been in 
Lebanon in 2013 and 2014. He left in 2014, and he was not able to come back in since 
the laws changed. Later, he managed to get back to Lebanon, but was deported, then he 
left to Turkey and then to Armenia, where he was offered a job opportunity to go back to 
Lebanon. He returned to Lebanon to work with refugees, which he cares about so much. 
He stresses that he loves the region, and that he considers himself lucky for having dual 
citizenship (Armenian and Syrian), since if he only had Syrian citizenship, he would not 
have been able to get back to Lebanon. He believes that in general, empathy is 
interchangeable: if you are Sunni, people will sympathize with you because of what is 
happening to Sunnis in Syria, and if you are Shia, people will sympathize because of 
what rebels/terrorists are doing to you in Syria. It is very complicated, but generally, 
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Syrians are not welcomed, no matter their religious affiliation. They are not respected. 
You might be discriminated against even if your Arabic accent is different. He pointed 
out to me that I should interview more people and get a different perspective, outside of 
the liberal perspective of NGO workers, which I was lucky to do later during my field 
research.  
Lebanese Citizens  
 In another interview, a Lebanese NGO worker from Mount Lebanon, believed 
that it would impossible to find a solution for Syrians to live in Lebanon with Lebanese 
people:   
The Lebanese think that they should have all the rights, and take the first place 
and opportunity in everything, and that is the same problem with the Palestinians, 
until now they do not have full rights, they cannot buy a house, they cannot buy 
anything, they have to put the house at the name of a Lebanese person. I do not 
think Syrians will stay in Lebanon and be equal and the conflict will be resolved. 
The solution is when the conflict in Syria resolves, there is NO solution in 
Lebanon, the solution is in Syria. 
 
My interviewee states that some Lebanese are okay with Syrians and they like 
them, but some other think that Syrians are a problem, and that they should not be living 
in Lebanon. According to him, most Lebanese do not like the presence of Syrians, since 
they are taking jobs and opportunities. And most Lebanese believe that those jobs and 
opportunities should be for them since it is their country. My interviewee has been 
working with children for about nine years, and believes that the past year was very tough 
and probably the most difficult in his life and work with children. He believes that this 
was probably because he started working with refugee children, who tend to be a bit 
different, perhaps not very polite and a bit aggressive, and they do not act like children 
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should act as consequence of the war. He stated that he has been able to see some 
changes through the work he does. He mentioned that today, the game that children are 
playing in Syria before coming to Lebanon is that of ‘little armies’ (Free Syrian Army vs. 
Government Army), using stones as their weapon to throw against each other. He 
believes that this is surely the result of war, but that it can be solved. My interviewee has 
been changing the way this game works, and making children use the stones as wheels 
instead. It is impossible to change everything directly; there is the need to be very patient 
with children and work little by little. He thinks there is not a Syrian or a Lebanese way 
to solve the crisis; he focuses on helping children no matter what, because he has also 
been through a tough childhood, a reason why he works to improve the lives of these 
children. My interviewee quoted Ghandi “You can stop racism if you simply do not think 
about it,” referring to the common tagging among residents and social tensions between 
Syrians and Lebanese.  
In another interview, an AUB student of International Studies and Political 
Science of Lebanese-Venezuelan heritage believes that social cohesion in this case is 
very difficult. However, he mentioned that the discourse of dialogue has been happening 
for a while now, though many Lebanese still feel some resentment for the Syrian military 
presence in Lebanon until 2005. Second, he mentions that the religion of most refugees 
plays a big role on social cohesion, since Lebanon is a sectarian country, and absorbing 
this amount of refugees would mean a change in demographics. He believes that Syrians 
and Lebanese are basically the same people, and they have almost the same culture. The 
problem is as he sees it due to the power that religion has in the country, and on the 
history between the two countries. Social cohesion is very difficult, since there are many 
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divisions and perspectives on the refugee crisis. He stated, “If Lebanon was not stable in 
2006, 2007, or 2008, when we did not have any Syrian refugee crisis, imagine how it is 
now with all these developments.” My interviewee, is a son of immigrants, who 
emigrated to Venezuela in the massive diaspora that moved to Latin America during the 
Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990. I tried to draw some parallels between the forced 
movement of Syrian refugees and Lebanese, as a result of war, and he believes that 
language was the hardest obstacle for their parents; however, that obstacle is not existent 
with Syrians in Lebanon. Furthermore, becoming used to the new society is always a 
challenge, even for himself, whose parents are Lebanese, mentioned that it was hard for 
him to adapt to Lebanon, and when the resources are not enough it becomes even harder.   
Stakeholders:  
Human Rights Watch 
Human Rights Watch’s representative believes that social cohesion it is not 
possible until Lebanese and Syrians are on par.  
UNHCR 
Mr. Bauze, from UNHCR, states that, people complain a lot about refugees. If 
you speak to Christians, they are afraid. If you speak to Sunnis, they are bit less afraid, 
but if you speak to Shias, they are more afraid. In Beirut, they are more afraid, even if 
they do not see the refugees as much. On the other hand, in the countryside, people said 
that Syrians have been there for 10 years, but now they just brought their families 
because of the conflict, so nothing is different since refugees are actually people that they 
have been working with. There is still a lot of sympathy from Lebanese to Syrians, since 
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there is a considerable amount of debt being contracted by Syrians from Lebanese who 
still provide them with monetary loans. There might be some abuse or exploitation, but 
he suggests that nobody is dying from hunger, additionally, when refugees are evicted or 
kicked out from their house, in 3 or 4 days they find a new house. Children have also not 
been abandoned. It is not a great situation, but there is still a lot of welcoming and 
empathy from Lebanese towards Syrians.  
Adviser for Lebanese Parliamentary Development  
Mr. Rabih Keys, who lends support to Parliamentary Development in Lebanon, 
believes that municipalities can play a role in mitigating conflicts by creating mitigation 
groups between refugees and the host community. The newly elected municipalities have 
the chance and opportunity to do this. In addition, he added that Lebanese hospitality 
towards Syrians exists and will remain. He mentioned that significantly, there is no much 
left to do, and of course, most Lebanese think that Syrians should go back, but there is 
still conflict in Syria, so it is an idea but it is hard to implement unless there is a safe 
zone. Until now, that is just a theoretical idea. Mr. Keys finished by stating that the main 
things are “mitigation and organization.” 
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Figure 9. Among all interviewees, sixteen answered that social cohesion was not possible until 
Lebanese and Syrians were equal. Two main stakeholder believed that it is possible. Four 
interviewees stated that it was something easier with younger generations, and that it could be 
done finding a common ground, such as the trash crisis. 
 
Perception and Public Discourse of Stakeholders  
Contrasting statements are a significant sign of discord and it is part of the 
rationale for my research. In this sense, I will present my findings, based on various 
actors, both local and international. Some of the perspectives and discourses of 
stakeholders on the refugee crisis have parallels. However, there are also many 
contrasting statements. Also, there is indeed discordance between the public discourse of 
international organizations, and what the refugees are receiving, or saying these INGOs 
actually do. I will present the varying perspectives of the stakeholders in the crisis, their 
public discourse and the international significance. INGOs and NGOs are key players on 
the Syrian refugee crisis, as they usually tend to fill the gaps left by the Lebanese 
government in providing assistance to refugees. Some opinions between INGOs were 
repetitive. Therefore, in this section, I present findings of the interviews that contributed 
most to my research and perspectives from UNHCR, Human Rights Watch, Nabad 
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Association for Development, and a government official who is a member of the 
Committee of Advisers for Development of the Lebanese Parliament.  
UNHCR 
Overview  
 The deputy representative of UNHCR to Lebanon, Mr. Jean-Nicholas Bauze, 
made several important statements on the crisis, including some background information 
that plays a key role in today’s developments.   
 Mr. Bauze stated that there are a lot of immediate needs for the refugees and also 
for the poor Lebanese. Before the crisis, there already existed some extreme poverty, 
especially in Northern Lebanon. In light of the conflict in Syria, a lot of communities are 
not doing well economically, affecting most of the poor Lebanese. Currently, the main 
humanitarian concern is to respond to those immediate needs of Syrian refugees and poor 
Lebanese. The stabilization phase is being carried out by UNDP (United Nations 
Development Program) that has developed a plan to avoid the country from falling apart 
in light of the changes in demographics with incoming refugees, and especially for what 
is happening in Syria as an important destabilization factor for Lebanon. However, a 
bigger concern is now if there are sufficient partners, sufficient funding, and sufficient 
leadership by the government of Lebanon because development needs the leadership of 
the state, and in Lebanon that is what needs to be strengthened.  
 Mr. Bauze also emphasized that integration of refugees in Lebanon is not 
possible. Lebanon is not a country of integration according to the government. Lebanon 
can receive refugees, but only temporarily. And this is not only specific for Syrians; it has 
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been the same for the Palestinians as well. There would never be a policy of integration 
because it goes against political intentions as well as the Lebanese constitution. However, 
the presence of Syrian refugees could lead to some dividends and benefit the Lebanese 
economy and the society, and that is where Lebanon is counting on the development 
industry. 
All the assistance being received by the international community is done through 
public services, when a school is rebuilt and when medical equipment is provided, then 
those are used by the Lebanese as well. Therefore, when UNHCR provides monetary 
assistance for Syrians to buy their food, they buy in Lebanese shops, so the money will 
go into the Lebanese shopkeeper’s pocket, and the shopkeeper will get their product from 
the Lebanese farmer, and, in the end, the farmer will benefit immensely from the fact that 
there are more consumers. Everything in Lebanon is locally produced: UNHCR repairs 
the refugees’ tents with Lebanese local products, making the profits go back to the 
Lebanese people. In addition, every Syrian is renting, at $200 per month on the average, 
which also benefits the Lebanese government. Most support is being done through public 
institutions; therefore, at some point, it will benefit the locals. UNHCR has provided a lot 
of equipment for postnatal care, which also benefits Lebanese children. Education and 
public health are the two main sectors that have benefitted from the assistance, and that 
will benefit not only the Lebanese, but also the refugees (refer to figure 10).  
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Figure 10.  Lebanon Crisis Response Partnership Funding Needs, May Statistical Dashboard 
2016, UNHCR. This figure is used to portray how funding needs are not being met entirely, and 
lack of funding is highlighted in this project as one of the consequences of lack of standardized 
policies among stakeholders, lack of leadership; corruption and lack good governance by the 
government.  In addition, this figure shows how Education and Health are one of the main sectors 
receiving assistance, which benefits both Syrians and Lebanese.  
 
I asked Mr. Bauze his position on the Lebanese jurisdiction in contrast with the 
1951 convention for refugees. According to him, the 1951 convention is sometimes 
overestimated, since Lebanon still a signatory of other human rights treaties. Even if 
Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 convention, it is still bound to all those other 
human rights treaties, which also apply to refugees. Lebanon is not a party, but it still 
respects the spirit of the convention, and has repeatedly said it will not turn any Syrian 
back. Lebanon does not want to keep the refugees, but at least they are not pushing them 
back. In this case, the international community should unite to guarantee their return in 
safety and dignity, or resettle them in a different country. Thus, signing the convention 
will not change anything, since the convention does not state that refugees are entitled to 
A,B,C,D or certain livelihoods, but they are entitled to protection and they should be 
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supported to address their needs, but it is not specified how that support should come. In 
the arena of political rhetoric, the government is always keen to remind everyone that 
Lebanon is not a part of the 1951 convention, but in fact they still respect most of it. 
Labor Force 
  Mr. Bauze believes that the Lebanese market is able to absorb the influx of 
refugees, despite the government saying it cannot. Agriculture and construction are 
sectors in which Syrians have always worked. Today, because of the war, the agriculture 
sector has been affected due to reduced exports to Syria. In real estate and construction, 
they still need Syrians workers. On the other hand, Mr. Bauze mentioned that several 
economists think that Lebanon cannot absorb this influx. 
 On the topic of education, Mr. Bauze believes that education is provided in 
schools, and that the government supports refugee access to education in public schools. 
According to Mr. Bauze, “one of the issues in the Middle East is that the economy is 
based on the informal economy, and most jobs offered are based on unskilled work. You 
go to school or you do not go to school, it makes no difference in what you want to 
become.”  He mentioned that literacy and education are still important because it means 
understanding the basics of living in a society. In light of the lack of certificate being 
provided to refugees by these schools, the majority of refugees will probably remain in 
the local economy; therefore, they will not need to show a diploma. Despite the lack of 
certification, Mr. Bauze states that education allows one to become a citizen and be a part 
of society, to behave and be a part of the political, economic and social world.  
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What’s Next?  
 Lastly, Mr. Bauze emphasized the many impediments that many Syrian refugees 
face that cannot be addressed by NGOs or INGOs, including UNHCR. The need for a 
policy shift to help people become more self-reliant is necessary, and not dependent on 
the good will of the international community. UNHCR understands that refugees cannot 
be integrated to Lebanon, but instead plans to make them self-reliant and less dependent 
on international assistance. The government is beginning to understand this fact, then 
after a policy shift, the refugees could benefit the local economy.  
Human Rights Watch 
Overview  
 I met with Ahmed Benchamsi, the Human Rights Watch’s Communications and 
Advocacy Director for Middle East and North Africa. Mr. Benchamsi believes that the 
government has no intention of changing the illegal status of refugees, and today refugees 
are not able to circulate freely, and they face several other challenges such as the inability 
of most of them to obtain work and temporary residency permits. According to Mr. 
Benchamsi (and this is his personal speculation and does not represent the view of 
HRW), the Lebanese government is afraid that if it facilitates the situation too much for 
the Syrians, the Palestinians might demand the same rights or more. The government is 
not interested in keeping the Syrian refugees in Lebanon who are not able to integrate and 
become part of the society.  
 In terms of education, Mr. Benchamsi believes that it is beneficial and necessary 
for Lebanon to educate children so that they can become civilians, plus it is a universal 
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right. If children are not educated, they will not be able to grow and become full members 
of civil society. The education provided in settlements is good as a temporary measure 
only. The quality of this education varies from school to school; therefore, it is 
impossible to predict and make generalizations.  Human Rights Watch recognizes that 
children need to attend school, and Human Rights Watch advocates and encourages non-
formal education.  
Labor Force 
 Mr. Benchamsi, when confronted with the question of the ability of the Lebanese 
market to absorb the influx of refugees, mentioned that usually jobs taken by refugees are 
not normally the same jobs taken by Lebanese. There are some fears that refugees might 
be taking the Lebanese people’s jobs and that this in consequence will lead to Lebanese 
unemployment. However, Lebanese and Syrians rarely compete for the same jobs. 
Nabad Association for Development  
Overview   
I met with representatives of Nabad Association for Development, a local NGO in 
the Beqaa Valley that provided me with an immense amount of help and assistance. 
Nabad cares about civil and humanitarian issues, and aims to fill the social, economic, 
cultural and educational gaps between the various groups of the society, especially 
among the underprivileged and vulnerable groups which are affected by crises and 
catastrophes. Nabad, located in Riyaq, is only 25km away from the Syrian border. In 
Nabad I met with some members of the staff, including Executive Director, Houssein 
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Shouman, and one of the lawyers of the NGO, Bashar Hamze, who has been working 
with the refugee crisis for 5 years.   
 According to Bashar, Lebanon is currently facing economic, social and security 
problems in light of the massive influx of refugees, plus a disorganized distribution of 
displaced persons across Lebanon. Most people believed that the crisis was going to be 
shorter, but currently there are more Syrians and Palestinian refugees than Lebanese. 
Bashar mentions that, before the crisis, Lebanon was already going through its very own 
sectarian divides (March 8 vs March 14 coalition). The Syrian war exacerbated divisions 
in Lebanon, since some Lebanese support the regime, and other are against it. From what 
I experienced in the field, most of the Lebanese who support the regime belong to Shia 
Islam, as well as Christians and Druze. Those who are against the regime tend to be 
Sunni, but it is impossible to fully generalize. According to Bashar, “water in villages, 
waste management, and electricity are scarcer due to the refugees.” Also, he states that 
Syrian labor is cheaper, which brings negative consequences to the Lebanese labor 
market. As well, there are Syrian women being paid to marry, especially in Jounieh and 
Beirut. This is an issue that I found previously as it is mentioned in a Human Rights 
Watch’s report (2016), that child marriage has increased dramatically among Syrian girls 
in Lebanon, “Child marriage is often a coping response to poverty for parents, since 
married girls move to live with their husbands and in-laws, but in some cases the practice 
is also driven by parents’ safety concerns for their daughters” (p.70). However, it is 
important to point out that child marriage was already common in Syria before the crisis 
(p.71).  He emphasizes the fact that a lot of funding from International Organizations 
went directly to the refugees, even though there were already many issues affecting the 
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Lebanese people.  UN HABITAT and AUB (2015) states that there are indeed serious 
economic and societal implications of the massive influx of refugees. Lastly, Nabad’s 
lawyer believes that the Syrian crisis will continue much longer and it will affect 
Lebanon, he mentions the protracted characteristics of the crisis might lead to another 
civil war in Lebanon, which directly resonates with information presented in this research 
previously by International Crisis Group (2015), “A number of challenges that affect 
Lebanon today are similar to those that provoked the civil war of the 1975-1990. (ii) ”  
  He emphasizes the fact that a lot of funding from International Organizations 
went directly to the refugees, even though there were already many issues affecting the 
Lebanese people. However, even if the crisis was solved, there would be the need to work 
on tensions among the different Syrian and Lebanese groups.  
The executive director of Nabad believes that the focus on projects of social 
cohesion should work on economical solutions well, which resonates with information 
presented previously by UN HABITAT and AUB (2015), that government institutions 
may need to implement solutions that create a healthy environment in which to formally 
integrate refugees into the economy, allowing the economy to flourish and benefit both 
communities. In addition, Nabad’s executive director adds that the authorities should start 
decreasing complex routines such as, challenging procedures with permits and the 
crossing of borders, which resonates with HRW (2016) standpoint, that the lack of a 
residency permit deprives many Syrians of education, freedom of movement with a fear 
of checkpoints, and their ability to conduct many educational and legal processes (p.39). 
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 In addition, Shouman believes that both Syrians and Lebanese should pay the 
same amount of taxes. In addition, he mentions that initially refugees started to travel out 
of Lebanon, but increased security measures in Europe and Turkey’s instability stopped 
it. According to Shouman, the crisis has had both positive and negative effects on 
Lebanon. Lebanon has suffered a lot, increased population rapidly, rent, cost of living, 
and others. However, there are also more funds coming to municipalities and local 
governments, and international organizations are working in partnership with smaller 
local companies because of the refugee crisis.  
 Houssein mentioned that around the Beqaa Valley, most ITS (unofficial 
settlements) are not provided with education, and that most families look to Nabad for 
education. Most refugee families need children from 12 to 18 years old to work and help 
support the family. Bashar believes that a good way to tackle these issues would be to 
provide economical support to some families so they can send their children to school, 
rather than to work. He believes that a focus on education is very important; it could help 
both Syrians and Lebanese. Finally, Hussein emphasizes that working with civil society 
is key in this issue to build capacity and sustainability.   
Lebanese Parliamentary Adviser for Development 
Overview  
 I interviewed Mr. Rabih Keys, a legal expert who is a member of the Committee 
of Advisers for Development of the Lebanese Parliament. Rabih was very helpful and he 
made time out of his busy schedule to welcome me at his office in Beirut. Rabih believes 
that Lebanese are being affected along many dimensions, mainly economically, but also 
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in social, political and security dimensions. Despite international assistance to Lebanon, 
the economy in Lebanon is showing some signs of recess and slowing down to almost 
0% growth rate because Syria was the main receiver of Lebanese exportations, and the 
main consumer of Lebanese goods as well. He stresses the fact that Lebanese people are 
very hospitable, and they receive everybody. He states that the discourse should focus on: 
Mitigating the crisis: international responsibility for the international community 
to help in these regards, and so far only small pieces or bits have been received to 
help with the refugee crisis. It is a huge responsibility for a small country with 
limited resources. Despite many internal problems (sectarian and political), this is 
just an additional problem that exacerbates all the occurring issues in Lebanon. 
From the human point of view, it is not possible to say that Lebanese will not 
receive Syrians. 
 
 Mr. Keys mentioned the fact that most Syrians are members of one religious 
group (Sunnis), and this creates fear among Lebanese communities on the sectarian 
balance in the country. This balance could be heavily affected by favoring one religious 
group over another. He believes that people should help Syrians stay in their country to 
preserve their identity and nationality. Lebanese jurisdiction, constitution and political 
attitudes are against nationalizing refugees (including Palestinians), and that it tries its 
best to keep them away. But, he also mentions that most refugees are very well 
accustomed to Lebanese society. They work together with Lebanese, and they (Syrians 
and Lebanese) go to the same schools. On the subject of education, Mr. Rabih believes 
that the Ministry of Education is doing a huge effort; he mentions that public schools are 
receiving a significant number of students, opening multiple shifts in order to provide 
good education to all students. However, limited resources sometimes slow down the 
process, despite the great effort the government is making. He mentioned that Lebanon 
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should definitely be highlighted as a great host for refugees and as an example for the 
world, without any political affiliation.  
Mr. Rabih added:  
This is now a worldwide crisis, it is not only affecting Lebanon, and since the war 
started, there has not been a day off… the international community should put 
more pressure on the main actors to solve the crisis. The figures of death and 
displaced persons keeps growing every day, with nothing significant happening, 
more than 500,000 people have been killed. Despite the losses on the economy (in 
Syria), about $200 billion of dollars in losses, they need about $100-150 billion 
for reconstruction, so all this stuff and war what for? The international mechanism 
to support the refugees does not seem to be very successful, and international 
organizations, most of their money are waiting for the overhead, so when a couple 
millions are awarded, the Syrians only end up receiving a couple of hundreds 
 
Finally, one of my colleagues, and who was part of the delegation from the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, which has allocated millions of aid for the refugee crisis, 
mentioned that, “The opinion among many diplomatic interns of the Syrian refugee crisis 
is that Lebanon is unable to come up with an organized plan to receive aid. On the other 
hand, Jordan and Turkey always come ready with a plan to receive aid from International 
Organizations or Foreign Missions. Lack of leadership and immense corruption are 
stopping aid from being donated and properly allocated.”  
 The majority of stakeholders make contrasting statements from each other about 
their role in the crisis, as well as their perceptions of the crisis. I found that several 
refugees have a negative perception of the role of INGOs on the ground. However, it is 
important to point out the significant role that small and local NGOs and grassroots 
organizations are playing on the crisis, since every stakeholder and refugees tend to 
describe their discourse in a positive way. I believe their role is essential in the crisis, and 
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local NGOs and grassroots organizations such as Nabad for Development play a positive 
role and they are aware of the local complexities, they also have extensive knowledge of 
the populations at risk and focus on sustainability and civil society.  
 The contrasting statements that I found resonate with the position by UN Habitat 
and AUB (2015) that mentions great examples of contradictory statements, even between 
government officials, which highlights the tensions and lack of a clear policy (pp.  61-
63). I present that INGOs, Government and NGOs have varying perspectives of the 
refugee crisis, and contrasting statements about each other’s work, including the 
international significance of their current public discourse. In addition, there is 
discordance between the public discourse of international organizations and the refugees’ 
perception of their work. NGOs and INGOs are key players of the refugee crisis since 
they tend to fill the gaps left behind by the government, which places most of the 
responsibility on these organizations.   
I present the possibility that the contrasting statements among governmental 
officials, and among all the different non-governmental stakeholders might come because 
of the confessional nature of the Lebanese state.  
 Organizations such as the UNHCR believe that in light of the stabilization phase, 
there is a concern about receiving the necessary leadership from the government in favor 
of development, which benefits from government entities as partners, and according to 
my interviewee, leadership is not a strength in the Lebanese government. . One of the 
interviewees from the group ‘refugees’ mentions, “For organizations to be able to help 
migrants fully, they need to be given some type of status.” However, one of the 
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interviewees from the government’s party stated that the Lebanese government is indeed 
doing its best for a small country with limited resources. In addition, he believes that only 
bits of aid have been received to help with the refugee crisis, and he adds, “The 
international mechanism to support the refugees does not seem to be very successful, and 
international organizations, most of their money are waiting for the overhead, so when a 
couple millions are awarded, the Syrians only end up receiving a couple of hundreds.” 
The interviewee calls for a greater international responsibility on this issue, since it seems 
to be falling short in front of greater amount of needs, and I would like to echo his call.  
 I believe that the inability to obtain any kind of documentation keeps most 
refugees in the shadows, and the implications of this issue are negative on every 
rationalization, which results in a never-ending cycle of issues that go back to the same 
root cause.  
  It is important to emphasize the remarks of local organizations such as Nabad, 
since based on my direct experience with them, they are the organizations that are better 
connected with both Syrians and Lebanese. In addition, they focus on sustainability, and 
durable solutions that help both populations at risk. I do believe the influx of refugees has 
had many negative impacts on the lives of villagers and small communities in rural 
Lebanon; however, as the executive director of Nabad mentioned, there is also more 
funding and attention coming to rural municipalities in light of the influx. This could 
have long-term positive impacts for the Lebanese community as their infrastructure is 
enhanced, and social services are upgraded. Intl Crisis Group (2015) was previously 
quoted on this research, “Syrian refugees frequently take the blame for everything wrong 
within Lebanon, from economic hardship to failing basic services and growing insecurity 
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- a trump card the political class plays at every opportunity instead of agreeing on a 
policy to address the challenge” (p.10). Certainly, an agreement on a refugee policy 
would be more viable that the current deadlock and legal limbo for refugees, I surely 
hope the new political forces in charge of Lebanon are able to commit to the realities of 
the current events, and bring to the table sustainable solutions.  
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
 In this section, I intend to highlight the complexities of the Lebanese political 
context and the management of the refugee crisis by multiple stakeholders, and the 
impediments that it presents to finding durable solutions for the affected communities. 
Also, I later present a set of recommendations for all the stakeholders that I interviewed; 
however, this does not mean that my recommendations will be implemented. On the 
other hand, the adviser for parliamentary development has manifested his interest in 
receiving my recommendations, but this does not represent a commitment to follow up 
with them.  
During my field research, I found the discordance among stakeholders alarming, 
and all the varying perspectives bring substantial challenges to the current interagency 
partnerships. There are many cooperation arrangements between stakeholders, and that 
cooperation between stakeholders is essential, but it needs to be consistent, and work 
towards to, at least, a framework of agreements on the refugee issue. I found many 
contrasting opinions, and when those contrasting opinions are implemented into ‘on-the-
ground discourses and policies,’ it affects and confuses everybody involved in trying to 
find solutions, and especially the affected parties, Syrian refugees and Lebanese. It also 
creates confusion and mistrust among the International Community and donors, which in 
turn reduces the most needed aid that Lebanon requires to meet goals of fundraising 
necessary to tackle the current challenges of the refugee crisis. The current discourse of 
INGOs has a massive international significance since the work they are currently doing is 
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impressive, and it is admirable in the international arena, and I believe they have the best 
intentions and try their best to help refugees and Lebanese; however, several refugees are 
perceiving something completely different; they feel discriminated against and alienated, 
and I make specific emphasis on the settlements of Tamnine el Fawka. The international 
community seems to have forgotten about these settlements in a rural area of Lebanon, 
and the local non-profits have had to fill in the gaps left by INGOs and the government. 
INGOs have a greater capacity to provide assistance, and the fact that refugees complain 
that they are being treated badly by some INGOs is disappointing to say the least. In 
addition, the government mentions that the help and aid of INGOs is not even enough to 
make it to most refugees, in light of the massive bureaucratic structures of the different 
UN organizations, most of the aid is spent on overhead (considered as a necessary evil).  
 I believe the lack of leadership by the government and the past deadlock of a 
presidential figure have placed many obstacles in the way for these INGOs to conduct 
their work more successfully. Obtaining capable and specialized employees that are 
connected enough to the crisis, and are also aware of the contextual complexities of the 
issue should not be something that Lebanon is responsible for. The need of more 
prepared staff should be highlighted, and INGOs should work towards having people 
more connected to the realities of the crisis.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 A number of challenges being faced by refugees in Lebanon appear to be directly 
connected to a lack of compliance by institutions and a lack of leadership by the 
government, which as a result brings many obstacles for INGOs and NGOs to work on 
the ground and form successful and effective coalitions to address the crisis in a more 
sophisticated manner, where resources would be more easily distributed and allocated. In 
addition, the contradictory statements among stakeholders makes it harder for the 
international community to assume the fact that their donations need to be increased, in 
light of the current inexistence of a standard plan and policy to address the refugee 
dilemma in Lebanon. It is not an easy dilemma whatsoever; and I believe that despite the 
effort by many INGOs to do more, sometimes the lack of a structural governmental plan 
to address the issue reduces their capacity to do so. I also believe that many INGOs on 
the ground must guarantee that their services and staff are well prepared and 
knowledgeable of the local contexts and of the populations at risk, in light of the negative 
opinions I found of their work among refugees. I consider that the Lebanese government 
is in a weak position; as a country with very little resources, and a massive population of 
refugees, I believe building capacity in government institutions would be a great start 
before calling on the international community to increase their aid; however, this must be 
a task where the international community should also provide greater assistance. 
Emphasizing the role of civil society is essential on addressing the main challenges of 
this crisis, and it must be done from a bottom-up approach, and not otherwise.  The 
empowerment of communities and the emphasis on local NGOs and grassroots 
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organizations must be an approach that the international community should take into 
consideration; they usually focus on the most affected communities and are able to tackle 
challenges in a less bureaucratic manner.   
An interviewee from HRW offered his personal speculation, and he believes that 
the government has no intention of providing refugees with a legal status or any other 
significant assistance, because Palestinians might demand the same. One of my 
interviewees from the group ‘refugees’ stated, “The problem is that, if they are given 
status as refugees then there would be obligations from part of the Lebanese government, 
and that government is not even able to provide for its own citizens.” In the terms of 
education, my interviewee from HRW believes that the education offered in settlements 
is only a temporary measure; however, he mentions that the quality of education varies 
from school to school so it is difficult to generalize. But on a report by HRW (2016) 
“Lebanon: 250,000 Syrian Children Out of School,” it is stated that despite the 
availability and the willingness of stakeholders to provide access to education, there are 
many other obstacles that obstruct the quality of education that these Syrian children are 
receiving. Most of the challenges that the Syrian youth is having to access education 
seem to go back to restricting measures put in place by government entities, and the lack 
of enforcement for those policies implemented to “help” as a response to those 
challenges. As mentioned by HRW (2016), “The lack of a residency permit deprives 
many Syrians of education, freedom of movement with a fear of checkpoints, and their 
ability to conduct many educational and legal processes (p.39).”  The interviewee from 
UNHCR also addressed the debate on education stating, “Education is provided in 
schools, and that the government is very strong in letting refugees access education in 
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public schools.” Again, as I learnt from refugees, “Certainly, Syrians have access to 
public schools, but now the following question would be, what kind of access? They 
might have access, but that access is useless if Syrians cannot understand what they are 
being taught. Plus teachers are not being paid enough, and this in result becomes a cycle 
of never-ending problems.”  
 I believe the new administration in Lebanon has an historical agreement in 
Lebanon to get things done, and it should take advantage of this moment to make those 
overdue changes in regard to refugee’s policy, and use this momentum on the Lebanese 
political arena to build on strategies to enhance accountability and enhanced governance, 
and take advantage of international aid to build capacity while helping Syrian refugees 
and Lebanese communities to acquire better lives. However, history has taught Lebanese 
that the same old politicians will never change.  But, Lebanese communities that are 
heavily affected by the crisis deserve a reliable system that can provide them with the 
most basic services, and serve them, without them having to turn to resilience and build 
their own ‘private’ government. Also, some refugees just ask for a chance to have access 
to a dignified life, and they are not even asking for a better life, but just for the essentials 
of life with access to basic necessities. A policy reform is necessary to allow refugees to 
make their own decisions, and leave to another country if they wish, since permanent stay 
in Lebanon is against the law, which I respect. However, Lebanon should make viable a 
path for refugees to solve their situation if we consider the current lockdown on their 
legal limbo, where desperation reigns over determination and hope. At the end, a route 
for them to have alternatives would be more humane than the current discourse of 
allowing them to stay and struggle undocumented just to satisfy the elites and fulfill the 
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labor market’s demands. A system of collaboration and mutual understanding, where 
Lebanon could benefit itself while helping refugees would be ideal; however, it has never 
been more possible than now, where the political discourse seems to have leverage and 
drive to accomplish viable changes on the system. There is a high possibility of change, 
but most Lebanese people believe that as long as the same old politicians and their 
cronies are still in power, nothing will improve.  
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
I believe that foreign influence from Saudi Arabia and Iran using Lebanon as their 
battleground for regional leadership, might hinder an autonomous and self-sufficient 
Lebanese state and goes beyond the Lebanese people’s will to find solutions for the 
refugee crisis.  As the refugee crisis in Lebanon enters its sixth year, most people would 
expect that there would be a clear policy and a viable coalition addressing the current 
challenges of the contextual complexities that set the agenda among stakeholders. 
However, the reality on the ground is far from unified and consistent, and there are 
several contrasting statements among stakeholders that create confusion and mistrust, 
which in turn exacerbates the impediments of refugees. The absence of an agreement 
among actors might just be added to another chapter of Lebanese confessionalism, and 
how it can, occasionally, become unsustainable and fruitless. More importantly, the lack 
of a strong leadership among state actors and a weak state became the main driver of 
creating cyclical issues with no solution at sight, and the irreversible postponement of 
urgent changes to prevent a greater conflict in Lebanon. Ideally, the current political 
momentum in Lebanese politics, and the return of an agreement to elect an executive 
power bring about the possibility, and the power necessary to apply long-needed changes, 
and create a successful coalition with a clear administrative structure, in order to address 
the current limbo of Syrian refugees; however, Lebanese politics are far from idyllic. For 
Syrian refugees, a legal solution will not thwart their right of return to a state, unlike the 
Palestinians; therefore, building solutions for them and for Lebanon should go hand by 
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hand in order for those to be effective and sustainable by creating what could be best for 
all.  
Today, several factors have an immense burden on the response by many 
Lebanese towards Syrian refugees. These factors could be used to explain many of the 
negative feelings and behaviors from the locals towards refugees. On one hand, there is 
religion, Lebanese society’s core and the main contributing factor for sectarianism. 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon are mostly Sunni Muslim, and Lebanese of other religious 
groups eventually see this as a ‘deal breaker’ that threatens to break the sectarian balance 
in the country. Also, historical factors have an immense influence, especially in older 
generations that lived through Syria’s brutal military occupation and control of Lebanese 
territory. As well, the current political fragility of Lebanon, constantly threatens to falling 
prey to the Syrian conflict, combined with high levels of instability in the region add up 
to the sentiments among many Lebanese to reject Syrian refugees. To sum up, economic 
competition intensifies negative feelings among Lebanese towards Syrian refugees, and 
eventually, for many locals this is the only and most important reason to reject them. 
Certainly, humanitarian sentiments and instincts among many Lebanese citizens to help 
Syrians have not faded suddenly, but on the other hand, all these elements have 
increasingly made Lebanese less willing to help and provide assistance. Thus, there is the 
impression that Lebanon’s confessionalism is also playing on distributing Lebanese 
among sectarian lines to respond to the Syrian refugee’s crisis. This in addition to the 
varying conflictive perspectives among stakeholders, a suggestion that confessionalism 
might have another chapter of failing to propose any aggressive restructuring and 
proactive solutions, but it remains keen on maintaining Lebanon stable, and in some way 
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with the highest Human Development Index among Arab states in the Levant. 14 
However, silence and postponement on this matter cannot be the most sustainable choice, 
and the time to renegotiate the status quo shall come.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
14  UNDP (2016). Human Development Report.  Lebanon. Human Development for Everyone: 
Briefing note for countries on the 2016 Human Development Report.  
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CHAPTER X 
   RECOMMENDATIONS  
Lebanon is indeed a unique case that defies many of the standards of international 
aid, and it is important to consider the complex contextual factors to propose feasible 
solutions. The solutions must support the livelihoods of refugees, and the socioeconomic 
dynamics of the Lebanese society. At the moment, these two communities depend on 
each other to keep a healthy balance, and any solution that benefits only one group and 
neglects the other has little hope of being fruitful. Therefore, a cohesive plan is necessary. 
Crucially, input from locals to develop a sustainable, cooperative plan may have the 
potential to benefit the refugees and the Lebanese. An interconnected strategy could work 
best, and this study therefore aims to explore such solutions. Technical approaches by 
humanitarian aid agencies, NGOs, and other international organization based on 
standards models may need to be reconfigured so they can take into consideration the 
local complexity in order to create effective and collective policies. Lastly, government 
institutions may need to implement solutions that create a healthy environment to 
formally integrate refugees into the economy, allowing this one to flourish and benefit 
both communities (UN HABITAT and AUB, 2015, p.75).  
In agreement with the party interviewed that represented the government, the 
international community should find alternative solutions for their aid to be delivered 
more efficiently, and also, take bigger responsibility, since most of the time the goals for 
fundraising are not met. When these goals are not met, it affects the development 
programs and the potential benefits it could have on the affected population. In addition, I 
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agree that the Lebanese government needs to tighten up a bit their system, and be 
prepared with a strong and qualified leadership team to deal with tasks that are also their 
responsibility. I have hopes on the new Lebanese administration, as the new executive 
head seems to have strong statements on policies, and seems to have the necessary 
coalitions and support from other powerful stakeholders to make positive changes happen 
in the country. Furthermore, certain policy shifts that could fill the loopholes and legal 
gray areas for refugees would be more sustainable and humane than allowing them to 
remain undocumented and without a chance to move on, or move out of Lebanon. 
 There are local non-profit organizations such as Nabad Association for 
Development that are working together with the Lebanese communities and Syrian 
refugees in the Beqaa Valley. Their projects emphasize cooperation, and Lebanese people 
and Syrian refugees see their work in a very positive way. As a local NGO, the majority 
of their projects are contingent upon funding, and I believe the majority of the 
international aid should be awarded to grass-roots organizations such as Nabad, that 
prefer to work with a bottom-up approach and build capacity in the community. I 
strongly consider that providing more support for local nonprofits, and encouraging the 
international community to further collaborations with these organizations would be 
ideal. 
Additionally, INGOs should allow the creation of faster and more sophisticated 
mechanisms for aid to be allocated and benefit directly the affected parties, and increase 
their pledge and call for a bigger responsibility on donors to cover the costs of overhead. 
The international community is doing a lot of work, but unfortunately, it is not enough. 
The international community needs to take a bigger responsibility, and the Lebanese 
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government has taken several steps, but they are not able to do much without the 
monetary assistance of international organizations and foreign parties. However, this does 
not mean that the government is doing enough, because it is not. As the main authority in 
Lebanon they have a bigger role than they think, and their authority and leadership is 
indispensable to make viable and sustainable changes. The role of the government must 
be tighten, and they should be responsible as well, for the creation of organized plans and 
tactics to allow for the allocation of more aid, and put an emphasis on accountability and 
cooperation.  The past deadlock on the government might have discouraged many 
international actors from allocating aid as well, due to a lack of governmental 
infrastructure and capacity to address the issues of the refugee crisis. However, now that 
a government has been formed, it must work towards cooperation, accountability and the 
creation of a structural agenda to allow more aid to be allocated, and ensure that the aid is 
delivered and used properly. Lastly, government institutions should enhanced their 
cooperation with INGOs and local NGOs, and provide a path of guidance and direction 
for ‘what to do next’.  
The international community should take more responsibility; exercise pressure 
for more leadership and accountability in the government; and encourage this leadership 
to work more closely with INGOs and NGOs, and other stakeholders, hence that every 
plan can be accomplished without the government failing to follow-up or coming up with 
an organized plan for the aid and projects to be delivered and accomplished. The 
international community should start from helping the government build functional 
capacity in order to implement all the steps mentioned above.    
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The International Community must be committed to respect Lebanon’s 
sovereignty, while helping the state build capacity and enhanced governance and 
accountability, and call for bigger responsibility among international donors to cover the 
costs of the refugee crisis. The Lebanese state does not have the capacity to deal with the 
crisis, neither administratively nor economically, and that is where the International 
Community is lacking in providing assistance. Also, and equally important, most non-
governmental organizations are not able to conduct their activities and projects 
successfully without the strong leadership of the state. Therefore, I emphasize an 
enhanced collaboration and a consistent agreement among stakeholders to create the trust 
necessary to attract more aid, and make the changes necessary to create the strategies that 
will determine the future of a whole generation, the potential rebuilding of Syria, and the 
long-term benefits for the needs of the Lebanese people.  
I make the following recommendations with the hopes of contributing to the 
current demands and challenges of the affected communities; however, given the current 
complexities of Lebanese politics, my recommendations are not guaranteed to be 
implemented entirely. I make these recommendations taking into consideration the 
realities on the ground, the calls for an enhanced leadership and accountability among 
governmental institutions, which would in turn bring about greater contributions from the 
international community. However, first the international community should offer 
assistance in building capacity among government institutions that might not be at the 
level necessary to meet some demands. As well, I aim to emphasize the role of grassroots 
organizations as fundamental players in the process of assisting refugees and affected 
Lebanese communities. The political economy structures in Lebanon seem to be shaping 
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the response of state actors, Lebanese elites’ association among sectarian basis, and their 
possession of the governmental physical structure just serves to hold more power and 
guarantee their constituencies. Other stakeholders are only able to do much as long as the 
elite consents. Powerful figures in the economy and politics such as the current president 
Aoun (Christian), Hariri (Sunni), Jumblatt (Druze), Berri (Shia), Nasrallah (Shia) and 
Gemayel (Christian) have in place a stable sectarian governance, but  fully comprised of 
their own interests. This competition and power-sharing fragmentation on the ground of 
the Syrian refugees’ dilemma present certain challenges; however, later election 
developments might give the slight impression that national interests are taking 
precedence over sectarian ones, which might finally bring about a solution for the refugee 
crisis (Van Veen, 2015).  
Lebanese Institutions  
- Put an emphasis on local grassroots organizations and facilitate their work, as 
their role is essential and they are the most connected to the realities and the 
parties involved on the crisis.  
- Keep track of enrollment policies and follow up individually with schools to 
guarantee proper implementation of the legal framework.  
- Stress the need for International donors for the allocation of aid in establishing 
schools in areas of greater need.  
- Crate a framework of cooperation, by proposing a structured agenda with INGOs 
and NGOs, and create an agreement, on at least, resolutions for the most 
challenging impediments of the crisis.  
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- Create a structural agenda of tactics and strategies to allow for the allocation of 
more aid, in cooperation with INGOs and NGOs in order to provide a path of 
direction and authority to provide solutions for the current challenges.  
- Enhance accountability and leadership among institutions, and enforce 
compliance with the policies on place.  
- Fully support non-formal education and vocational programs as a powerful 
alternative to fill many gaps in the education sector.  
- Either ensure that students have access to quality English or French support 
programs or allow teachers the possibility to be flexible enough to teach in Arabic 
when required.  
- Allow Syrians access to a loophole to resolve their situation through a non-
permanent regularization of their legal status.  
- Lebanon should remain a country of temporary status; however, providing 
refugees with incentives (work permits) to improve their situation and move-on 
would be more sustainable than a dead-lock in the settlement of their status.  
International Donors and Community 
- Increase funding for education and local NGOs that are aware of the contextual 
complexity of the crisis, and have considerable knowledge of the population at 
risk.  
- Increase funding for rehabilitation facilities and adjustments to infrastructure.  
- Increase funding to guarantee that refugees can cover school-related expenses. 
- Increase funding mainly for the Ministry of Education and Higher Education. 
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- Take a bigger role in supporting Lebanon as the country is currently falling short 
in funding for all the expected outcomes, this is a collective and global problem.  
- As a global issue, it requires a more aggressive approach, as donations still fall 
short of what it is needed.  
- Increase funding for social-cohesion programs between Syrians and Lebanese 
- Provide greater support for an enhanced leadership among state actors and 
increased accountability.  
- Put an emphasis on local grassroots organizations, especially in rural areas, as 
their need is greater and their work includes durable solutions for capacity 
building.  
- Increase funding and provide technical support for multilateral organizations and 
INGOs with large overhead expenses, and push for more accountability. 
- Push for a sophisticated system to be implemented to allow aid to be allocated 
successfully, and put pressure on multilateral organizations and INGOs to make 
reforms in regards to their structural allocation of aid and exorbitant overhead 
costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
APPENDIX 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EACH RESEARCH QUESTION OR HYPOTHESIS 
My questions were divided into three sets, one for Syrian refugees, one for 
Lebanese, and the other for Lebanese-Venezuelans.  I used the same script for Lebanese 
to interview anybody else that was not a member of the other two groups (INGO’s staff 
member, and others). 
 To Refugees: 
1. What is your name, your education and professional background? –   In 
this question, I intended to find out the background of my interviewee, and make the 
connections between his answers and his upbringing.  
2. What are some of the most common impediments that you are facing at 
this moment and what are some of the approaches you have taken to cope or deal with 
those challenges? – In this question, I intended to examine the most common challenges 
that refugees were facing, and how were INGO’s or NGO’s helping to assist with those 
needs. In addition, I intended to capture the perception among refugees of the 
international aid methods in place.  In some cases, INGOs were highly criticized by 
interviewees.  
3. What is your current perception of the crisis after 5 years? – In this 
question, I intended to examine the general feeling among migrants after 5 years of crisis 
without any permanent solution at sight, with the hopes of capturing other challenges that 
might not come as easy with the first question.  
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4. Whether the temporal presence of refugees in Lebanon could lead to some 
dividends and benefits to the economy and the society of Lebanon? – In this question, I 
intended to obtain first-hand testimony from experts and other social groups, and obtain 
proof of the allegations that refugees in Lebanon might be used for low skilled labor 
purposes according to previous literature.  In addition, I intended to examine the possible 
implications of the presence of refugees in Lebanon.  
5. How is the Lebanese jurisdiction affecting your quality of life? Ex. Lack 
of Civil Rights (work permits, discrimination motivated by” keep the refugees away” and 
other limitations that you have encountered ) – In this question, I intended to examine 
more in detail some challenges that several Syrian refugees are facing, and expand on 
what it seems to be one of the biggest impediments; the work and residence permits.  
6. Do you believe education in unofficial settlements is enough for refugees 
to secure decent livelihoods and adapt to Lebanon?  What skills would help refugees 
secure decent livelihoods? – In this question, I intended to examine the real value of 
education of education in settlements (if there were any), and what kind of access 
refugees had to continue their studies. Also, I intended to examine other alternatives of 
education, such as vocational education.  
7. Do you think the Lebanese labor market is able to absorb the influx of 
refugees? – As well, in this question, I tried to examine if the Lebanese market was able 
to absorb the influx of refugees, and find parallels and contrasting statements with 
previous literature on this matter.  
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8. In your opinion, what cohesive national initiatives would you propose that 
could bring Lebanese and refugees together, and benefit both communities? Including 
better integration, specific Syrian Refugee policies, or a proactive governmental body to 
address the issue. – In this question, I intended to examine the possibilities of social 
cohesion, and of comprehensive initiatives between Lebanese and Syrians to contribute to 
solutions to the crisis. My hypothesis on this matter was that it is possible, but perhaps 
after my field research, the possibilities of social cohesion are higher among younger 
generations.  
9. Please suggest any interconnected strategy that you consider could be the 
best approach to contribute to the stabilization phase? – In this question, I had the same 
intentions as with question # 8, I just phrased it in a different manner that might have 
been easier for the interviewee to digest.  
10. Why did you choose Lebanon instead of another neighboring country? 
And also, what is your opinion on Lebanese hospitality? – In this question, I intended to 
explore the current perception among Syrian refugees of the current state of their 
situation in Lebanon, and if it would have been different in another neighboring country. 
My hypothesis in this question was that Lebanon was indeed the first choice among 
several refugees.  
11. Is there anything you want to add that you consider important. – In this 
question, I tried to examine anything else that I previously did not cover.  
To Lebanese Nationals: 
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1. What is your name, education and professional background? – provide 
name only if you wish to be identified. –  In this question, I intended to find out the 
background of my interviewee, and make the connections between his answers and his 
upbringing. 
2. How are Lebanese or how are you being affected by the refugee crisis? – 
In this question, I intended to examine their current challenges because of the refugee 
crisis.  
3. How do you perceive your role in front of this crisis or what is your 
current perception of the crisis after 5 years?  – In this question, I intended to examine 
their current perception of the crisis, and what methods they were using to cope with the 
challenges they were facing.  
4. Whether the temporal presence of refugees in Lebanon could lead to some 
dividends and benefits to the economy and the society of Lebanon – In this question, I 
intended to obtain first-hand testimony from experts and other social groups, and obtain 
proof of the allegations that refugees in Lebanon might be used for low skilled labor 
purposes according to previous literature.  In addition, I intended to examine the possible 
implications of the presence of refugees in Lebanon.  
5. Only for experts: How the Lebanese context (its own jurisdiction) in 
contrast with the 1951 refugee convention is affecting the refugees’ progress in this new 
social order. – In this question, I intended to examine the knowledge from experts on the 
fact that Lebanon was not a signatory of the 1951 convention, and the possible 
implications this event is currently having on the crisis.  
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6. Is education inside settlements enough to provide refugees with enough 
skills to be productive in the Lebanese society? What skills would help Syrians integrate 
better? – In this question, I intended to examine the real value of education of education 
in settlements (if there was any), and what kind of access refugees had to continue their 
studies. Also, I intended to examine other alternatives of education, such as vocational 
education. 
7. Do you think the Lebanese labor market is able to absorb the massive 
influx of refugees? – As well, in this question, I tried to examine if the Lebanese market 
was able to absorb the influx of refugees, and find parallels and contrasting statements 
with previous literature on this matter.  
8. What would you propose to support the refugees and benefit the affected 
Lebanese in order to contribute to the ‘so-called’ stabilization phase? This might include 
specific policies on Syrian refugees or proactive government bodies to address the issue. 
– In this question, I tried to examine possible cohesive initiatives from Lebanese and 
experts that might benefit refugees and affected Lebanese.  
9. Please suggest any interconnected strategy or what type of policy that you 
consider could be the best approach to contribute to the stabilization phase? – As well, as 
question # 8, I tried to examine the possibility of social cohesion between Syrians and 
Lebanese.  
10. Has Lebanese hospitality been affected by the Syrian Refugees’ crisis? – 
In this question, I intended to examine the repercussions that the protracted 
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characteristics of the crisis were having on the initial aid provided to refugees by 
Lebanese.  
11. For humanitarian orgs only: What are those basic needs that the NGOs or 
your agency cannot address  – In this question, suggested by Mr. Bauze from UNHCR, it 
was recommended to me that I include this question in order to address those challenges 
that refugees were facing, and that fall out of the scope of several international 
organizations.  
To Lebanese-Venezuelans: In this group, I only included two extra question from 
that of the ‘ Lebanese Nationals’ script.  
1.  ¿Desde cuándo vive en el Líbano? Por favor indique si usted o sus padres 
emigraron a Venezuela durante el conflicto Libanes. Translation: For how long have you 
been living in Lebanon? Please indicate if you or your parents emigrated to Venezuela 
during the Lebanese Civil War. – In this question, I intended to find some parallels 
between those migrants that left Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War to Venezuela, 
and those now leaving Syria.  
2.  Usted, como hijo de migrantes de un conflicto, o como migrante de un 
conflicto, cualquier sea el caso. En su experiencia, ¿cuáles son las situaciones más 
difíciles que los migrantes resultantes de conflictos encuentran en su camino, y que 
consejos les darías a esos refugiados Sirios que se puedan encontrar en la misma 
situación? Translation: You, as a son of conflict migrants, or as a conflict migrant 
yourself. In your own experience, what are the most challenging experiences that conflict 
migrants encounter in their way, and what would you recommend to those Syrian 
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migrants that might be in the same situation? – As well, in this question I intended to 
examine the potential parallels between the challenges faced by this group of migrants 
and Syrian refugees, and the potential parallels/contrasts between them. In addition, I 
intended to examine possible recommendations from the experiences of migrants during 
the Lebanese Civil War.  
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